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ORCIDVincent Conitzer
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- affiliation: Carnegie Mellon University, USA
- affiliation (former): Duke University, Durham, USA
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2020 – today
- 2025
[i75]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them. CoRR abs/2501.08905 (2025)- 2024
- [j62]Eric Horvitz
, Vincent Conitzer, Sheila A. McIlraith, Peter Stone:
Now, Later, and Lasting: 10 Priorities for AI Research, Policy, and Practice. Commun. ACM 67(6): 39-40 (2024) - [c216]Vincent Conitzer:
The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games. AAAI 2024: 9607-9615 - [c215]Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups. AAAI 2024: 9952-9959 - [c214]Kyle Boerstler, Vijay Keswani, Lok Chan, Jana Schaich Borg, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods. AIES (1) 2024: 156-167 - [c213]Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
On the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation. AIES (1) 2024: 711-723 - [c212]Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer:
Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets. AAMAS 2024: 2513-2515 - [c211]Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig, Wesley H. Holliday, Bob M. Jacobs, Nathan Lambert, Milan Mossé, Eric Pacuit, Stuart Russell, Hailey Schoelkopf, Emanuel Tewolde, William S. Zwicker:
Position: Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback. ICML 2024 - [c210]Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts. IJCAI 2024: 2669-2677 - [c209]Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer:
Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets. IJCAI 2024: 2984-2993 - [c208]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Manolis Zampetakis, Tuomas Sandholm, Paul Goldberg, Vincent Conitzer:
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity. IJCAI 2024: 2994-3004 - [c207]Rakshit Trivedi, Akbir Khan, Jesse Clifton, Lewis Hammond, Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán, Dipam Chakraborty, John P. Agapiou, Jayd Matyas, Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets, Barna Pásztor, Yunke Ao, Omar G. Younis, Jiawei Huang, Benjamin Swain, Haoyuan Qin, Mian Deng, Ziwei Deng, Utku Erdoganaras, Yue Zhao, Marko Tesic, Natasha Jaques, Jakob Foerster, Vincent Conitzer, José Hernández-Orallo, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, Joel Z. Leibo:
Melting Pot Contest: Charting the Future of Generalized Cooperative Intelligence. NeurIPS 2024 - [c206]Yixuan Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction. NeurIPS 2024 - [c205]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas A. Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium. EC 2024: 73-74 - [i74]Vojtech Kovarík, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Recursive Joint Simulation in Games. CoRR abs/2402.08128 (2024) - [i73]Eric Horvitz, Vincent Conitzer, Sheila A. McIlraith, Peter Stone:
Now, Later, and Lasting: Ten Priorities for AI Research, Policy, and Practice. CoRR abs/2404.04750 (2024) - [i72]Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig, Wesley H. Holliday, Bob M. Jacobs, Nathan Lambert, Milan Mossé, Eric Pacuit, Stuart Russell, Hailey Schoelkopf, Emanuel Tewolde, William S. Zwicker:
Social Choice for AI Alignment: Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback. CoRR abs/2404.10271 (2024) - [i71]Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts. CoRR abs/2406.00851 (2024) - [i70]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Manolis Zampetakis, Tuomas Sandholm, Paul W. Goldberg, Vincent Conitzer:
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity. CoRR abs/2406.15970 (2024) - [i69]Vincent Conitzer:
The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games. CoRR abs/2407.07625 (2024) - [i68]Vincent Conitzer:
Why should we ever automate moral decision making? CoRR abs/2407.07671 (2024) - [i67]Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
On the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation. CoRR abs/2407.18889 (2024) - [i66]Kyle Boerstler, Vijay Keswani, Lok Chan, Jana Schaich Borg, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods. CoRR abs/2408.02862 (2024) - [i65]Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction. CoRR abs/2410.05550 (2024) - [i64]Vojtech Kovarík, Nathaniel Sauerberg, Lewis Hammond, Vincent Conitzer:
Game Theory with Simulation in the Presence of Unpredictable Randomisation. CoRR abs/2410.14311 (2024) - [i63]Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics? CoRR abs/2411.04462 (2024) - [i62]Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria. CoRR abs/2412.14570 (2024) - [i61]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation. CoRR abs/2412.16934 (2024) - [i60]Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Stuart Russell:
Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games. CoRR abs/2412.17797 (2024) - [i59]Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer:
The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2412.19659 (2024) - 2023
- [j61]Vincent Conitzer, Gillian K. Hadfield, Shannon Vallor:
Technical Perspective: The Impact of Auditing for Algorithmic Bias. Commun. ACM 66(1): 100 (2023) - [j60]Vincent Conitzer:
Puzzle: Does Occasional Simulation Enable Cooperation? (Puzzle in Honor of Joe Halpern's 70th Birthday). SIGecom Exch. 21(1): 62-63 (2023) - [c204]Vincent Conitzer, Caspar Oesterheld:
Foundations of Cooperative AI. AAAI 2023: 15359-15367 - [c203]Vincent Conitzer:
Automated Moral Decision Making by Learning from Humans: Why and How (invited paper). ETHAICS@IJCAI 2023 - [c202]Vojtech Kovarík, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players. IJCAI 2023: 2800-2807 - [c201]Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Paul W. Goldberg:
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games. IJCAI 2023: 2878-2887 - [c200]Caspar Oesterheld, Johannes Treutlein, Roger B. Grosse, Vincent Conitzer, Jakob N. Foerster:
Similarity-based cooperative equilibrium. NeurIPS 2023 - [c199]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas A. Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games. NeurIPS 2023 - [c198]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation. EC 2023: 1161-1186 - [c197]Steven Jecmen, Minji Yoon, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah, Fei Fang:
A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer Review. WWW 2023: 3816-3826 - [c196]Caspar Oesterheld, Abram Demski, Vincent Conitzer:
A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality. TARK 2023: 421-440 - [i58]Vojtech Kovarík, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players. CoRR abs/2305.11261 (2023) - [i57]Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Paul W. Goldberg:
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games. CoRR abs/2305.17805 (2023) - [i56]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen Marcus McAleer, Andreas Alexander Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2306.05216 (2023) - [i55]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen Marcus McAleer, Andreas Alexander Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Steering No-Regret Learners to Optimal Equilibria. CoRR abs/2306.05221 (2023) - [i54]Ryan Liu, Steven Jecmen, Vincent Conitzer, Fei Fang, Nihar B. Shah:
Testing for Reviewer Anchoring in Peer Review: A Randomized Controlled Trial. CoRR abs/2307.05443 (2023) - [i53]Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Non-Excludable Bilateral Trade Between Groups. CoRR abs/2312.11800 (2023) - 2022
- [j59]Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game playing. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 36(2): 46 (2022) - [j58]Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo, Peter Stone:
Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization. Oper. Res. 70(1): 562-584 (2022) - [j57]Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets. Oper. Res. 70(2): 963-989 (2022) - [j56]Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Nicolás E. Stier Moses, Eric Sodomka, Christopher A. Wilkens:
Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets. Manag. Sci. 68(12): 8515-8535 (2022) - [j55]Vincent Conitzer:
Puzzle: communicating to plan noam nisan's 60th birthday workshop. SIGecom Exch. 20(1): 73 (2022) - [c195]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Planning with Participation Constraints. AAAI 2022: 5260-5267 - [c194]Vincent Conitzer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Hanrui Zhang:
Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks. AAAI 2022: 6411-6419 - [c193]Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Fei Fang, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah:
Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design. AAMAS 2022: 1642-1644 - [c192]Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Fei Fang, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah:
Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design. HCOMP 2022: 102-113 - [c191]Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Andrew Critch, Vincent Conitzer, Stuart Russell:
For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria. ICML 2022: 5924-5943 - [c190]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints. EC 2022: 1121-1140 - [e8]Vincent Conitzer, John Tasioulas, Matthias Scheutz, Ryan Calo, Martina Mara, Annette Zimmermann:
AIES '22: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, Oxford, United Kingdom, May 19 - 21, 2021. ACM 2022, ISBN 978-1-4503-9247-1 [contents] - [i52]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints. CoRR abs/2205.07767 (2022) - [i51]Steven Jecmen, Minji Yoon, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah, Fei Fang:
A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer Review. CoRR abs/2207.02303 (2022) - [i50]Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Andrew Critch, Vincent Conitzer, Stuart Russell:
For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria. CoRR abs/2207.03470 (2022) - [i49]Steven Jecmen, Nihar B. Shah, Fei Fang, Vincent Conitzer:
Tradeoffs in Preventing Manipulation in Paper Bidding for Reviewer Assignment. CoRR abs/2207.11315 (2022) - [i48]Caspar Oesterheld, Johannes Treutlein, Roger B. Grosse, Vincent Conitzer, Jakob N. Foerster:
Similarity-based Cooperation. CoRR abs/2211.14468 (2022) - 2021
- [j54]Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer:
The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 9(1): 6:1-6:35 (2021) - [c189]Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Haoming Li, David Rein, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Classification with Strategically Withheld Data. AAAI 2021: 5514-5522 - [c188]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification. AAAI 2021: 5789-5796 - [c187]Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Incentive-Aware PAC Learning. AAAI 2021: 5797-5804 - [c186]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection. AAAI 2021: 5805-5812 - [c185]Duncan C. McElfresh, Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Vincent Conitzer, Jana Schaich Borg, John P. Dickerson:
Indecision Modeling. AAAI 2021: 5975-5983 - [c184]Michael Anis Mihdi Afnan, Cynthia Rudin, Vincent Conitzer, Julian Savulescu, Abhishek Mishra, Yanhe Liu, Masoud Afnan:
Ethical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select Embryos in In Vitro Fertilization. AIES 2021: 316-326 - [c183]Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Safe Pareto Improvements for Delegated Game Playing. AAMAS 2021: 983-991 - [c182]Vincent Conitzer:
Automated Mechanism Design for Strategic Classification: Abstract for KDD'21 Keynote Talk. KDD 2021: 1 - [c181]Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design. NeurIPS 2021: 27785-27797 - [c180]Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka:
Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. WINE 2021: 76-94 - [i47]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification. CoRR abs/2104.05182 (2021) - [i46]Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners). CoRR abs/2104.14317 (2021) - [i45]Michael Anis Mihdi Afnan, Cynthia Rudin, Vincent Conitzer, Julian Savulescu, Abhishek Mishra, Yanhe Liu, Masoud Afnan:
Ethical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select Embryos in In Vitro Fertilization. CoRR abs/2105.00060 (2021) - [i44]Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/2105.06008 (2021) - [i43]Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Fei Fang, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah:
Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design. CoRR abs/2108.06371 (2021) - 2020
- [j53]Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, Vincent Conitzer:
Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values. Artif. Intell. 283: 103261 (2020) - [j52]Aaron M. Kolb, Vincent Conitzer:
Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning. J. Econ. Theory 189: 105094 (2020) - [c179]Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Duncan C. McElfresh, Vincent Conitzer, John P. Dickerson, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making. AIES 2020: 214-220 - [c178]Vincent Conitzer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Hanrui Zhang:
Learning Opinions in Social Networks. ICML 2020: 2122-2132 - [c177]Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Learning the Valuations of a k-demand Agent. ICML 2020: 11066-11075 - [c176]Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists. AISafety@IJCAI 2020 - [c175]Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Nihar B. Shah, Vincent Conitzer, Fei Fang:
Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments. NeurIPS 2020 - [c174]Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching. EC 2020: 879-910 - [c173]Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems. WINE 2020: 430-443 - [c172]Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng, Shaddin Dughmi:
Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games. WINE 2020: 444-458 - [c171]Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Decision Scoring Rules. WINE 2020: 468 - [i42]Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Duncan C. McElfresh, Vincent Conitzer, John P. Dickerson, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making. CoRR abs/2001.09766 (2020) - [i41]Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, Vincent Conitzer:
Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values. CoRR abs/2005.09755 (2020) - [i40]Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Nihar B. Shah, Vincent Conitzer, Fei Fang:
Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments. CoRR abs/2006.16437 (2020) - [i39]Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka:
Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. CoRR abs/2007.09579 (2020) - [i38]Duncan C. McElfresh, Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Vincent Conitzer, Jana Schaich Borg, John P. Dickerson:
Indecision Modeling. CoRR abs/2012.08485 (2020) - [i37]Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Haoming Li, David Rein, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
Classification with Strategically Withheld Data. CoRR abs/2012.10203 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j51]Vincent Conitzer:
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. Math. Oper. Res. 44(3): 783-792 (2019) - [j50]Vincent Conitzer:
Puzzle: the AI circus: (puzzle in honor of Tuomas Sandholm's 50th birthday). SIGecom Exch. 17(2): 76-77 (2019) - [c170]Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods. AAAI 2019: 1853-1860 - [c169]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
A Better Algorithm for Societal Tradeoffs. AAAI 2019: 2229-2236 - [c168]Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer:
A PAC Framework for Aggregating Agents' Judgments. AAAI 2019: 2237-2244 - [c167]Vincent Conitzer:
Designing Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence. AAAI 2019: 9755-9759 - [c166]Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses, Chris Wilkens:
Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets. EC 2019: 587 - [c165]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
When Samples Are Strategically Selected. ICML 2019: 7345-7353 - [c164]Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically Transformed. NeurIPS 2019: 3187-3195 - [e7]Vincent Conitzer, Gillian K. Hadfield, Shannon Vallor:
Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, AIES 2019, Honolulu, HI, USA, January 27-28, 2019. ACM 2019, ISBN 978-1-4503-6324-2 [contents] - 2018
- [j49]Suguru Ueda, Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Naoki Ohta, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 32(4): 503-533 (2018) - [j48]Vincent Conitzer:
Technical perspective: Designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy. Commun. ACM 61(2): 92 (2018) - [j47]Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer, Benjamin C. Lee:
Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach. Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst. 2(1): 3:1-3:36 (2018) - [c163]Yuan Deng, Vincent Conitzer:
Disarmament Games With Resource. AAAI 2018: 981-988 - [c162]Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, Vincent Conitzer:
Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align With Human Values. AAAI 2018: 1636-1643 - [c161]Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, Vincent Conitzer:
Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values. AIES 2018: 115 - [c160]Max F. Kramer, Jana Schaich Borg, Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions? AIES 2018: 204-209 - [c159]Mathijs Michiel de Weerdt, Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Koos van der Linden:
Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid. AAMAS 2018: 1924-1926 - [c158]Mathijs de Weerdt, Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Koos van der Linden:
Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid. IJCAI 2018: 4736-4742 - [c157]Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng, Max Kramer:
Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence. ISAIM 2018 - [c156]Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer, Benjamin C. Lee:
Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach. SIGMETRICS (Abstracts) 2018: 33-35 - [c155]Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets. WINE 2018: 443 - [i36]Vincent Conitzer:
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. CoRR abs/1805.02226 (2018) - [i35]Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses, Chris Wilkens:
Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets. CoRR abs/1811.07166 (2018) - [i34]Vincent Conitzer:
Can Artificial Intelligence Do Everything That We Can? CoRR abs/1812.02560 (2018) - 2017
- [j46]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer:
Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 59: 437-462 (2017) - [j45]Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Edith Elkind, Rupert Freeman, Toby Walsh:
Justified representation in approval-based committee voting. Soc. Choice Welf. 48(2): 461-485 (2017) - [j44]Vincent Conitzer, R. Preston McAfee:
Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(2) (2017) - [c154]Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Peter Stone:
Automated Design of Robust Mechanisms. AAAI 2017: 298-304 - [c153]Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng, Max Kramer:
Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Workshops 2017 - [c152]Yuan Deng, Vincent Conitzer:
Disarmament Games. AAAI 2017: 473-479 - [c151]Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng, Max Kramer:
Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence. AAAI 2017: 4831-4835 - [c150]Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Peter Stone:
Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated Distributions: Can We Learn Optimal Mechanisms? AAMAS 2017: 69-77 - [c149]Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer:
Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings. IJCAI 2017: 4580-4587 - [c148]Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah:
Fair Public Decision Making. EC 2017: 629-646 - [e6]Vincent Conitzer, Roch Guérin:
Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, NetEcon@EC 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 26-30, 2017. ACM 2017, ISBN 978-1-4503-5089-1 [contents] - [i33]Vincent Conitzer:
On Stackelberg Mixed Strategies. CoRR abs/1705.07476 (2017) - [i32]Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets. CoRR abs/1706.07151 (2017) - [i31]Mathijs de Weerdt, Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer:
Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid. CoRR abs/1709.07480 (2017) - 2016
- [j43]Vincent Conitzer:
On Stackelberg mixed strategies. Synth. 193(3): 689-703 (2016) - [j42]Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 19:1 (2016) - [c147]Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners). AAAI 2016: 369-375 - [c146]Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo:
Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility. AAAI 2016: 383-389 - [c145]Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Yuqian Li:
Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs. AAAI 2016: 460-467 - [c144]Haifeng Xu, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer, Shaddin Dughmi, Milind Tambe:
Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games. AAMAS 2016: 150-158 - [c143]Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah:
False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks. AAMAS 2016: 332-340 - [c142]Catherine Moon, Vincent Conitzer:
Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1413-1414 - [c141]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer, Dmytro Korzhyk:
Catcher-Evader Games. IJCAI 2016: 329-337 - [c140]Catherine Moon, Vincent Conitzer:
Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation. IJCAI 2016: 416-423 - [c139]Garrett Andersen, Vincent Conitzer:
ATUCAPTS: Automated Tests that a User Cannot Pass Twice Simultaneously. IJCAI 2016: 3662-3669 - [c138]Sune K. Jakobsen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Vincent Conitzer:
Timeability of Extensive-Form Games. ITCS 2016: 191-199 - [c137]Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah:
False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks. ISAIM 2016 - [c136]Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners). ISAIM 2016 - [c135]Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Yuqian Li:
Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs. ISAIM 2016 - [c134]Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer:
The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs. EC 2016: 85-102 - [c133]Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment. WINE 2016: 1-14 - [e5]Vincent Conitzer, Dirk Bergemann, Yiling Chen:
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '16, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24-28, 2016. ACM 2016, ISBN 978-1-4503-3936-0 [contents] - [e4]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press 2016, ISBN 9781107446984 [contents] - [r2]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Introduction to Computational Social Choice. Handbook of Computational Social Choice 2016: 1-20 - [r1]Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh:
Barriers to Manipulation in Voting. Handbook of Computational Social Choice 2016: 127-145 - [i30]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer, Dmytro Korzhyk:
Catcher-Evader Games. CoRR abs/1602.01896 (2016) - [i29]Vincent Conitzer:
Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence. CoRR abs/1605.06048 (2016) - [i28]Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment. CoRR abs/1610.04312 (2016) - [i27]Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer:
Nash Welfare and Round Robin Share. CoRR abs/1611.04034 (2016) - 2015
- [j41]Vincent Conitzer:
A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists. Synth. 192(9): 2887-2899 (2015) - [j40]Vincent Conitzer:
Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs? Synth. 192(12): 4107-4119 (2015) - [c132]Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo:
Assessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design. AAAI 2015: 763-769 - [c131]Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Edith Elkind, Rupert Freeman, Toby Walsh:
Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting. AAAI 2015: 784-790 - [c130]Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy. AAAI 2015: 819-826 - [c129]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer:
Cooperative Game Solution Concepts that Maximize Stability under Noise. AAAI 2015: 979-985 - [c128]Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer:
Complexity of Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs. AAMAS 2015: 357-365 - [c127]Vincent Conitzer, Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman:
Crowdsourcing Societal Tradeoffs. AAMAS 2015: 1213-1217 - [c126]Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer:
General Tiebreaking Schemes for Computational Social Choice. AAMAS 2015: 1401-1409 - [c125]Catherine Moon, Vincent Conitzer:
Maximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks. IJCAI 2015: 216-223 - [i26]Sune K. Jakobsen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Vincent Conitzer:
Timeability of Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/1502.03430 (2015) - 2014
- [j39]Joshua Letchford, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer:
On the value of commitment. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 28(6): 986-1016 (2014) - [j38]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions. Artif. Intell. 216: 287-308 (2014) - [j37]Mathijs Michiel de Weerdt, Paul Harrenstein, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties. Games Econ. Behav. 86: 405-420 (2014) - [j36]Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer:
False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives. Int. J. Game Theory 43(3): 599-618 (2014) - [j35]Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
Notes from the EC'14 program chairs. SIGecom Exch. 13(1): 2-4 (2014) - [c124]Vincent Conitzer, Angelina Vidali:
Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time. AAAI 2014: 623-629 - [c123]Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer:
On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules. AAAI 2014: 675-681 - [c122]Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Melissa Dalis, Joshua Letchford, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer:
Beat the Cheater: Computing Game-Theoretic Strategies for When to Kick a Gambler out of a Casino. AAAI 2014: 798-804 - [c121]Haifeng Xu, Fei Fang, Albert Xin Jiang, Vincent Conitzer, Shaddin Dughmi, Milind Tambe:
Solving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains. AAAI 2014: 1500-1506 - [c120]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer:
Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games. AAMAS 2014: 581-588 - [c119]Vincent Conitzer:
The Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks. ISAIM 2014 - [e3]Moshe Babaioff, Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014. ACM 2014, ISBN 978-1-4503-2565-3 [contents] - [i25]Vincent Conitzer:
Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries. CoRR abs/1401.3449 (2014) - [i24]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders. CoRR abs/1401.3876 (2014) - [i23]Dmytro Korzhyk, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, Milind Tambe:
Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness. CoRR abs/1401.3888 (2014) - [i22]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1408.1486 (2014) - 2013
- [j34]Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer:
Undominated Groves Mechanisms. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 46: 129-163 (2013) - [j33]Vincent Conitzer, R. Preston McAfee:
The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(1): 1:1-1:3 (2013) - [c118]Garrett Andersen, Vincent Conitzer:
Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games. AAAI 2013: 53-59 - [c117]Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer:
Solving Security Games on Graphs via Marginal Probabilities. AAAI 2013: 591-597 - [c116]Vincent Conitzer:
The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks. Allerton 2013: 1482-1487 - [c115]Manish Jain, Vincent Conitzer, Milind Tambe:
Security scheduling for real-world networks. AAMAS 2013: 215-222 - [c114]Taiki Todo, Vincent Conitzer:
False-name-proof matching. AAMAS 2013: 311-318 - [c113]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer:
Optimal internet auctions with costly communication. AAMAS 2013: 683-690 - [c112]Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer:
Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests. IJCAI 2013: 254-262 - [c111]Vincent Conitzer:
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. WINE 2013: 96-108 - 2012
- [j32]Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer:
Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition. Int. J. Game Theory 41(1): 91-129 (2012) - [j31]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 2-14 (2012) - [j30]Vincent Conitzer, Curtis R. Taylor, Liad Wagman:
Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases. Mark. Sci. 31(2): 277-292 (2012) - [j29]Vincent Conitzer:
Should social network structure be taken into account in elections? Math. Soc. Sci. 64(1): 100-102 (2012) - [j28]Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, Charles L. Isbell Jr.:
Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games. SIGecom Exch. 11(2): 36-40 (2012) - [c110]Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, Charles L. Isbell Jr.:
Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games. AAAI 2012: 1380-1386 - [c109]Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections. AAAI 2012: 1485-1491 - [c108]Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security. AAAI 2012: 2106-2112 - [c107]Vincent Conitzer:
An Undergraduate Course in the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics. EAAI 2012: 2357-2362 - [c106]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Approximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains. ISAIM 2012 - [c105]Vincent Conitzer, Lirong Xia:
Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach. KR 2012 - [c104]Sayan Bhattacharya, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network. WINE 2012: 482-488 - [e2]Wiebe van der Hoek, Lin Padgham, Vincent Conitzer, Michael Winikoff:
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2012, Valencia, Spain, June 4-8, 2012 (3 Volumes). IFAAMAS 2012 [contents] - [i21]Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer:
Undominated Groves Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1203.1809 (2012) - [i20]Vincent Conitzer:
Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory. CoRR abs/1205.2654 (2012) - [i19]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. CoRR abs/1207.1368 (2012) - [i18]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal. CoRR abs/1208.6501 (2012) - 2011
- [j27]Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer:
Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 22(1): 127-150 (2011) - [j26]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive markets for donating to charities. Artif. Intell. 175(7-8): 1251-1271 (2011) - [j25]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 41: 25-67 (2011) - [j24]Dmytro Korzhyk, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, Milind Tambe:
Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 41: 297-327 (2011) - [c103]Vincent Conitzer, Dmytro Korzhyk:
Commitment to Correlated Strategies. AAAI 2011: 632-637 - [c102]Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia:
Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information. AAAI 2011: 638-643 - [c101]Manish Jain, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, Milind Tambe:
A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs. AAMAS 2011: 327-334 - [c100]Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr:
Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability. AAMAS 2011: 1013-1020 - [c99]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia:
Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains. IJCAI 2011: 158-163 - [c98]Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr:
Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources. IJCAI 2011: 273-279 - [c97]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders. IJCAI 2011: 446-451 - [c96]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang:
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes. EC 2011: 179-188 - [c95]Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala:
Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources. WINE 2011: 13-24 - [c94]Mingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer, Amy Greenwald, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond. WINE 2011: 158-169 - [c93]Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Vincent Conitzer, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections. WINE 2011: 363-374 - [c92]Vincent Conitzer:
Discussion of "A conditional game for comparing approximations". AISTATS 2011: 72-73 - [p1]Vincent Conitzer:
Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem. Metareasoning 2011: 119-128 - [i17]Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia:
Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information. CoRR abs/1106.5448 (2011) - 2010
- [j23]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. Artif. Intell. 174(5-6): 363-381 (2010) - [j22]Vincent Conitzer, Makoto Yokoo:
Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations. AI Mag. 31(4): 65-78 (2010) - [j21]Vincent Conitzer:
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 58(3-4): 239-259 (2010) - [j20]Vincent Conitzer:
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents. Commun. ACM 53(3): 84-94 (2010) - [j19]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 9(1): 1 (2010) - [j18]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: borrowing as cheaply as possible. SIGecom Exch. 9(1): 9 (2010) - [c91]Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr:
Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games. AAAI 2010: 805-810 - [c90]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules. AAAI 2010: 915-920 - [c89]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. AAAI 2010: 921-926 - [c88]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies. AAAI 2010: 1676-1679 - [c87]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang:
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators. AAMAS 2010: 399-408 - [c86]Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo:
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 633-640 - [c85]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors. AAMAS 2010: 881-888 - [c84]Zhengyu Yin, Dmytro Korzhyk, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, Milind Tambe:
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. AAMAS 2010: 1139-1146 - [c83]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal. AAMAS 2010: 1475-1476 - [c82]Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. EC 2010: 83-92 - [c81]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel D. Procaccia:
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. EC 2010: 275-284 - [c80]Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia:
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. SODA 2010: 554-572 - [c79]Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchford, Kamesh Munagala, Liad Wagman:
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks. WINE 2010: 209-221 - [c78]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences. WINE 2010: 402-414 - [e1]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, William S. Zwicker:
Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10101, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany 2010 [contents] - [i16]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, William S. Zwicker:
10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Computational Foundations of Social Choice 2010 - [i15]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, William S. Zwicker:
10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Computational Foundations of Social Choice 2010
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j17]Razvan C. Bunescu, Vitor R. Carvalho, Jan Chomicki, Vincent Conitzer, Michael T. Cox, Virginia Dignum, Zachary Dodds, Mark Dredze, David Furcy, Evgeniy Gabrilovich, Mehmet H. Göker, Hans W. Guesgen, Haym Hirsh, Dietmar Jannach, Ulrich Junker, Wolfgang Ketter, Alfred Kobsa, Sven Koenig, Tessa A. Lau, Lundy Lewis, Eric T. Matson, Ted Metzler, Rada Mihalcea, Bamshad Mobasher, Joelle Pineau, Pascal Poupart, Anita Raja, Wheeler Ruml, Norman M. Sadeh, Guy Shani, Daniel G. Shapiro, Sarabjot Singh Anand, Matthew E. Taylor, Kiri Wagstaff, Trey Smith, William E. Walsh, Rong Zhou:
AAAI 2008 Workshop Reports. AI Mag. 30(1): 108-118 (2009) - [j16]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 69-98 (2009) - [j15]Vincent Conitzer:
Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 35: 161-191 (2009) - [j14]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 8(1) (2009) - [j13]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: identifying the champion. SIGecom Exch. 8(1) (2009) - [j12]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 8(2): 1 (2009) - [j11]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: a dutch dutch auction clock auction. SIGecom Exch. 8(2): 10 (2009) - [c77]Vincent Conitzer:
Approximation guarantees for fictitious play. Allerton 2009: 636-643 - [c76]Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer:
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market. AMMA 2009: 61-73 - [c75]Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer:
A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market. AAMAS (2) 2009: 1407-1408 - [c74]Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. CP 2009: 623-638 - [c73]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Lirong Xia:
How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda? IJCAI 2009: 103-108 - [c72]Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie, Lirong Xia:
Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. IJCAI 2009: 109-115 - [c71]Erik Halvorson, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr:
Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games. IJCAI 2009: 159-166 - [c70]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules. IJCAI 2009: 336-341 - [c69]Lirong Xia, Michael Zuckerman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Vincent Conitzer, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules. IJCAI 2009: 348-353 - [c68]Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala:
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. SAGT 2009: 250-262 - [c67]Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conitzer:
A qualitative vickrey auction. EC 2009: 197-206 - [c66]Vincent Conitzer:
Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory. UAI 2009: 101-108 - [c65]Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo:
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. WINE 2009: 89-100 - [c64]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves:
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. WINE 2009: 244-255 - [i14]Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia:
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. CoRR abs/0904.3501 (2009) - 2008
- [j10]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
New complexity results about Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 63(2): 621-641 (2008) - [j9]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 7(2) (2008) - [j8]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: strategically choosing products to release. SIGecom Exch. 7(2) (2008) - [j7]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 7(3) (2008) - [j6]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: product adoption in a social network. SIGecom Exch. 7(3) (2008) - [c63]Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer:
Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. AAAI 2008: 190-195 - [c62]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. AAAI 2008: 196-201 - [c61]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang:
Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. AAAI 2008: 202-207 - [c60]Vincent Conitzer:
Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account. AMEC/TADA 2008: 60-72 - [c59]Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategic betting for competitive agents. AAMAS (2) 2008: 847-854 - [c58]Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 927-934 - [c57]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1039-1046 - [c56]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2) 2008: 1047-1054 - [c55]Vincent Conitzer:
Comparing Multiagent Systems Research in Combinatorial Auctions and Voting. ISAIM 2008 - [c54]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. EC 2008: 99-108 - [c53]Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. EC 2008: 109-118 - [c52]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. EC 2008: 210-219 - [c51]Vincent Conitzer:
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. WINE 2008: 295-306 - [c50]Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis:
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. WINE 2008: 426-437 - [c49]Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamal Jain:
An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. WINE 2008: 696-707 - [i13]Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis:
Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. CoRR abs/0810.2865 (2008) - 2007
- [j5]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang:
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007) - [j4]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Mach. Learn. 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007) - [j3]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 7(1): 1-2 (2007) - [j2]Vincent Conitzer:
Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination. SIGecom Exch. 7(1): 69-70 (2007) - [c48]Vincent Conitzer:
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries. AAMAS 2007: 65 - [c47]Vincent Conitzer:
Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. AAMAS 2007: 253 - [c46]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Incremental Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256 - [c45]Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier:
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506 - [c44]Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. EC 2007: 30-39 - [c43]Vincent Conitzer:
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness. TARK 2007: 102-111 - [i12]Vincent Conitzer:
Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 - [i11]Vincent Conitzer:
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 - 2006
- [j1]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006) - [c42]Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. AAAI 2006: 613-619 - [c41]Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam:
Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. AAAI 2006: 620-626 - [c40]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006: 627-634 - [c39]Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006: 697-702 - [c38]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528 - [c37]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544 - [c36]Vincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera:
Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). ICML 2006: 209-216 - [c35]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. EC 2006: 82-90 - 2005
- [c34]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi:
Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254 - [c33]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260 - [c32]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488 - [c31]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer:
Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501 - [c30]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515 - [c29]Vincent Conitzer:
Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. AAAI 2005: 1642-1643 - [c28]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669 - [c27]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki:
A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64 - [c26]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity of common voting rules. EC 2005: 78-87 - [c25]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of (iterated) dominance. EC 2005: 88-97 - [c24]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152 - 2004
- [c23]Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm:
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218 - [c22]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225 - [c21]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14 - [c20]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135 - [c19]Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16 - [c18]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004 - [c17]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. EC 2004: 51-60 - [c16]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. EC 2004: 132-141 - [c15]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. EC 2004: 262-263 - [c14]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. EC 2004: 266-267 - 2003
- [c13]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24 - [c12]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90 - [c11]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98 - [c10]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618 - [c9]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. IJCAI 2003: 765-771 - [c8]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788 - [c7]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106 - [c6]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. EC 2003: 230-231 - [c5]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. EC 2003: 232-233 - [c4]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214 - [i10]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. CoRR cs.AI/0307017 (2003) - [i9]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. CoRR cs.GT/0307002 (2003) - [i8]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003 (2003) - [i7]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. CoRR cs.GT/0307006 (2003) - [i6]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. CoRR cs.GT/0307016 (2003) - [i5]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. CoRR cs.GT/0307018 (2003) - 2002
- [c3]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319 - [c2]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397 - [c1]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design. UAI 2002: 103-110 - [i4]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. CoRR cs.GT/0205073 (2002) - [i3]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. CoRR cs.GT/0205074 (2002) - [i2]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design. CoRR cs.GT/0205075 (2002) - [i1]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. CoRR cs.GT/0205076 (2002)
Coauthor Index
[i75] [c208] [c205] [i70] [i59] [c199] [i56] [i55] [i22] [j31] [i19] [j26] [j10] [j5] [j4] [c46] [c45] [j1] [c40] [c39] [c38] [c37] [c35] [c34] [c33] [c32] [c31] [c30] [c28] [c27] [c26] [c25] [c24] [c23] [c22] [c21] [c20] [c19] [c18] [c17] [c16] [c15] [c14] [c13] [c12] [c11] [c10] [c9] [c8] [c7] [c6] [c5] [c4] [i10] [i9] [i8] [i7] [i6] [i5] [c3] [c2] [c1] [i4] [i3] [i2] [i1]
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