"Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal ..."

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm (2004)

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DOI: 10.1145/988772.988793

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2025-01-19

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Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. EC 2004: 132-141

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