


default search action
2nd SAGT 2009: Paphos, Cyprus
- Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou:
Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Paphos, Cyprus, October 18-20, 2009. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5814, Springer 2009, ISBN 978-3-642-04644-5 - Dov Monderer:
Monotonicity in Mechanism Design. 1 - Mihalis Yannakakis:
Computational Aspects of Equilibria. 2-13 - Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
:
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem. 14-23 - André Berger
, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hossein Naeemi:
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations. 24-35 - Clemens Thielen
, Sven Oliver Krumke:
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents. 36-47 - Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Partition Equilibrium. 48-59 - Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. 60-71 - José R. Correa, Nicolás Figueroa:
On the Planner's Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design. 72-84 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Arantza Estévez-Fernández
:
Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems. 85-96 - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring:
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games. 97-108 - Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan:
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency. 109-121 - Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii V. Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Jörg Rothe, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games. 122-134 - Christoph Dürr, Kim Thang Nguyen:
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games. 135-146 - Hyunwoo Jung, Kyung-Yong Chwa:
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds. 147-158 - Elliot Anshelevich
, Sanmay Das, Yonatan Naamad:
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings. 159-170 - Elliot Anshelevich
, Satish V. Ukkusuri
:
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing. 171-182 - Christine Chung
, Evangelia Pyrga:
Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games. 183-195 - Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games. 196-207 - Elliot Anshelevich
, Bugra Çaskurlu:
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design. 208-219 - Andrew Byde, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
:
Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities. 220-232 - Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz:
A New Derandomization of Auctions. 233-237 - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann:
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles. 238-249 - Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala:
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. 250-262 - Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, Alexander Skopalik:
Doing Good with Spam Is Hard. 263-274 - Khaled M. Elbassioni
, Rajiv Raman, Saurabh Ray, René Sitters:
On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems. 275-286 - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games. 287-298 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski
, Arkadii M. Slinko
:
Swap Bribery. 299-310 - Vittorio Bilò
, Angelo Fanelli
, Michele Flammini
, Luca Moscardelli:
Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games. 311-322 - Ronald Koch, Martin Skutella:
Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time. 323-334 - Po-An Chen, David Kempe:
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes. 335-346 - Leah Epstein, Asaf Levin
:
On Equilibria for ADM Minimization Games. 347-358

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.