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ORCID16th WINE 2020: Beijing, China
- Xujin Chen
, Nikolai Gravin, Martin Hoefer, Ruta Mehta:
Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, WINE 2020, Beijing, China, December 7-11, 2020, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 12495, Springer 2020, ISBN 978-3-030-64945-6
Matching
- Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Benjamin Plaut:
Almost Envy-Free Repeated Matching in Two-Sided Markets. 3-16 - Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Neil Newman:
Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates. 17-30 - Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger:
A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas. 31-44 - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Julián Mestre, Okke Schrijvers, Christopher A. Wilkens:
The Ad Types Problem. 45-58 - Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dusan Knop, Rolf Niedermeier:
Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List. 59-73
Markets
- Benjamin Plaut:
Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation. 77-88 - Ashish Goel, Benjamin Plaut:
Counteracting Inequality in Markets via Convex Pricing. 89-101 - Devansh Jalota, Marco Pavone, Qi Qi, Yinyu Ye:
Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing. 102-116
Mechanism Design and Pricing
- Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu:
Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question. 119-132 - Hanrui Zhang:
A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. 133-146 - Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta:
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions. 147-161 - Will Ma:
Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-Price Items. 162-176 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis:
Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information. 177-190 - Makis Arsenis, Odysseas Drosis, Robert Kleinberg:
Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders. 191-205 - Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. 206-219 - Max Bender, Jacob Gilbert, Aditya Krishnan, Kirk Pruhs:
Competitively Pricing Parking in a Tree. 220-233
Routing, Scheduling, Load Balancing
- Lukas Graf, Tobias Harks:
The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria. 237-251 - Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras, Cosimo Vinci:
Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology. 252-265 - Aditya Saraf, Anna R. Karlin, Jamie Morgenstern:
Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion. 266-279 - Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi, Alexander Skopalik:
Improving Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games. 280-294 - Cong Chen, Yinfeng Xu:
The Curse of Rationality in Sequential Scheduling Games. 295-308 - Cong Chen, Paul Giessler, Akaki Mamageishvili, Matús Mihalák, Paolo Penna:
Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games. 309-322 - Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Cosimo Vinci:
Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing. 323-337
Fairness
- Haris Aziz:
Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness. 341-355 - Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Nisarg Shah:
Optimal Bounds on the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods. 356-369 - Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, Nisarg Shah:
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All. 370-383 - Paul W. Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong:
Consensus Halving for Sets of Items. 384-397
Learning
- Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío:
Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries. 401-415 - Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky:
A Cardinal Comparison of Experts. 416-429 - Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems. 430-443 - Vincent Conitzer, Yuan Deng, Shaddin Dughmi:
Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games. 444-458
Abstracts
- Ross Rheingans-Yoo:
Large Random Matching Markets with Localized Preference Structures Can Exhibit Large Cores. 461 - Ron Kupfer:
The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings. 463 - Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada:
How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Effect of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections. 464 - Marco Pavone, Amin Saberi, Maximilian Schiffer, Matthew Tsao:
Online Hypergraph Matching with Delays. 465 - Tao Jiang, Young-San Lin, Thành Nguyen:
Market Equilibrium in Multi-tier Supply Chain Networks. 467 - Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer:
Decision Scoring Rules. 468 - Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Nonatomic Routing Games. 469 - T. Tony Ke, K. Sudhir:
Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and PersonalData Driven Markets. 470 - Jad Salem, Swati Gupta:
Closing the Gap: Mitigating Bias in Online Résumé-Filtering. 471 - Stefanos Leonardos, Iosif Sakos, Costas Courcoubetis, Georgios Piliouras:
Catastrophe by Design in Population Games: Destabilizing WastefulLocked-In Technologies. 473 - Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, Kirankumar Shiragur:
Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets. 475
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