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ORCIDACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 5
Volume 5, Number 1, November 2016
- Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan:
The AND-OR Game. 1:1-1:22 - Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier:
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. 2:1-2:23 - Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen:
Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox. 3:1-3:22 - Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee:
When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue? 4:1-4:29 - Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova
, Jeff S. Shamma:
Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty. 5:1-5:27 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, László A. Végh:
A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets. 6:1-6:13 - Chi-Kin Chau, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Majid Khonji:
Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart Grid. 7:1-7:29 - Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri:
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? 8:1-8:26
Volume 5, Number 2, March 2017
- Vincent Conitzer, R. Preston McAfee:
Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future. - David M. Pennock, Ilya Segal:
Editorial from the New TEAC Co-Editors-in-Chief. - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
Computing Dominance-Based Solution Concepts. 9:1-9:22 - Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, Jonathan R. Ullman:
An Antifolk Theorem for Large Repeated Games. 10:1-10:20 - Amos Azaria, David Sarne, Yonatan Aumann:
Distributed Matching with Mixed Maximum-Minimum Utilities. 11:1-11:23 - Hau Chan, Jing Chen, Gowtham Srinivasan:
Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences. 12:1-12:36 - Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Shaddin Dughmi, Yaron Singer:
Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions. 13:1-13:20
Volume 5, Number 3, August 2017
- Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler:
A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem. 14:1-14:18 - Aaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira, Rebecca N. Wright:
Dynamics at the Boundary of Game Theory and Distributed Computing. 15:1-15:20 - Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar:
Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare. 16:1-16:42 - Rafael M. Frongillo, Jens Witkowski:
A Geometric Perspective on Minimal Peer Prediction. 17:1-17:27
Volume 5, Number 4, December 2017
- Richard Cole, Shravas Rao:
Applications of α-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions. 18:1-18:29 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling. 19:1-19:16 - Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li, Rakesh Vohra:
Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction. 20:1-20:18 - Antje Bjelde, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm:
Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices. 21:1-21:20 - Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi:
Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations. 22:1-22:39 - Branislav Bosanský, Simina Brânzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund, Peter Bro Miltersen:
Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. 23:1-23:24
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