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ORCID24th ACM-EC 2023: London, UK
- Kevin Leyton-Brown, Jason D. Hartline, Larry Samuelson:
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023, London, United Kingdom, July 9-12, 2023. ACM 2023 - Andreas Abels
, Elias Pitschmann, Daniel Schmand:
Prophet Inequalities over Time. 1-20 - Gagan Aggarwal, Andrés Perlroth, Junyao Zhao:
Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World. 21 - Saba Ahmadi, Avrim Blum, Kunhe Yang:
Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification. 22-58 - Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr:
Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets. 59 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, Frank Yang:
Comparison of Screening Devices. 60 - Hannaneh Akrami, Noga Alon, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta:
EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number. 61 - Miguel Alcobendas, Shunto Kobayashi, Ke Shi, Matthew Shum:
The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising Markets. 62 - Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth:
Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World. 63 - Ahmet Alkan, Kemal Yildiz:
Equitable stable matchings under modular assessment. 64 - Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi:
Interviewing Matching in Random Markets. 65 - Tal Alon, Paul Duetting, Yingkai Li, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts. 66 - Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria. 67-87 - Ayoub Amil, Ali Makhdoumi, Yehua Wei:
Multi-Item Order Fulfillment Revisited: LP Formulation and Prophet Inequality. 88 - Ioannis Anagnostides, Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Stephen McAleer:
Algorithms and Complexity for Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team Games. 89 - Nima Anari, Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan:
Distortion in metric matching with ordinal preferences. 90-110 - Gabriel P. Andrade, Rafael M. Frongillo, Georgios Piliouras:
No-Regret Learning in Games is Turing Complete. 111 - Nemanja Antic, George Georgiadis:
Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference Approach. 112 - Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes:
Robust Auction Design with Support Information. 113 - Ali Aouad, Will Ma:
A Nonparametric Framework for Online Stochastic Matching with Correlated Arrivals. 114 - Ali Aouad, Ömer Saritaç, Chiwei Yan:
Centralized Versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching Platforms. 115 - Guy Aridor:
Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment. 116 - Guy Aridor, Duarte Gonçalves, Daniel Kluver, Ruoyan Kong, Joseph A. Konstan:
The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens. 117 - Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. 118 - Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz:
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. 119 - P. M. Aronow, Haoge Chang, Patrick Lopatto:
Fast computation of exact confidence intervals for randomized experiments with binary outcomes. 120 - Alex P. Arsenault-Morin, Hayri Alper Arslan, Matthew Gentry:
On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare. 121 - Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Geng Zhao:
Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets. 122 - Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li, Ariel Schvartzman:
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling. 123-152 - Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer:
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity. 153-182 - Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron:
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings. 183 - Markus Baldauf, Christoph Frei, Joshua Mollner:
Principal Trading Arrangements: Optimality under Temporary and Permanent Price Impact. 184 - Eric Balkanski, Yuri Faenza, Noémie Périvier:
The Power of Greedy for Online Minimum Cost Matching on the Line. 185-205 - Ian Ball, Jan Knoepfle:
Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable? 206 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar:
Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice. 207 - Martino Banchio, Giacomo Mantegazza:
Adaptive Algorithms and Collusion via Coupling. 208 - Siddhartha Banerjee, Matthew Eichhorn, David Kempe:
Allocating with Priorities and Quotas: Algorithms, Complexity, and Dynamics. 209-240 - Siddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris, Éva Tardos:
Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources. 241 - Siddharth Barman, Arindam Khan, Sudarshan Shyam, K. V. N. Sreenivas:
Guaranteeing Envy-Freeness under Generalized Assignment Constraints. 242-269 - Gerdus Benade, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jamie Tucker-Foltz:
You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too. 270 - Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Nicholas Wu:
Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising. 271 - Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris:
Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing. 272 - Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco:
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. 273-292 - Omar Besbes, Yuri Fonseca, Ilan Lobel, Fanyin Zheng:
Signaling Competition in Two-Sided Markets. 293 - Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl, Matthias Oberlechner:
Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging. 294 - Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Ignacio Rios, Alfredo Torrico:
Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice. 295 - Tommaso Bondi:
Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews. 296 - Tommaso Bondi, Michelangelo Rossi, Ryan Stevens:
The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings. 297 - Ariel Boyarsky, Hongseok Namkoong, Jean Pouget-Abadie:
Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-out. 298 - Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Balanced Donor Coordination. 299 - Ido Bright, Arthur Delarue, Ilan Lobel:
Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices. 300 - Markus Brill, Jannik Peters:
Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting. 301 - Archit Bubna, Ashish Chiplunkar:
Prophet Inequality: Order selection beats random order. 302-336 - Eric Budish, Ruiquan Gao, Abraham Othman, Aviad Rubinstein, Qianfan Zhang:
Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI). 337-368 - Noah Burrell, Grant Schoenebeck:
Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study. 369-389 - Johannes Bäumler, Martin Bullinger, Stefan Kober, Donghao Zhu:
Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets. 390 - Yang Cai, Eric Xue:
Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization. 391-410 - Ozan Candogan, Chen Chen, Rad Niazadeh:
Correlated Cluster-Based Randomized Experiments: Robust Variance Minimization. 411 - Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti:
Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes. 412-448 - Javier Cembrano, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm:
Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection. 449 - Yi-Chun Chen, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Mallesh M. Pai:
The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs. 450 - Yilun Chen, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar, Wenxin Zhang:
Feature Based Dynamic Matching. 451 - Ziyun Chen, Zhiyi Huang, Dorsa Majdi, Zipeng Yan:
Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions. 452-471 - Andrew Bongjune Choi:
I'll Tell You Tomorrow: Committing to Future Commitments. 472 - George Christodoulou, Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Fair allocation in graphs. 473-488 - Roberto Corrao, Yifan Dai:
Mediated Communication with Transparent Motives. 489 - José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Paul Duetting, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Jan Olkowski, Kevin Schewior:
Trading Prophets. 490-510 - Bo Cowgill, Cosmina Dorobantu:
Targeting versus Competition in Marketplace Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Internet Ads. 511 - Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Anant Shah:
Equity Pay in Networked Teams. 512 - Sulagna Dasgupta:
Communication via hard and soft information. 513 - Sulagna Dasgupta:
Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based Screening. 514 - Rahul Deb, Ludovic Renou:
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 515 - Inbal Dekel, Rachel Cummings, Ori Heffetz, Katrina Ligett:
The Privacy Elasticity of Behavior: Conceptualization and Application. 516 - Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák:
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees. 517-535 - Battal Dogan, Lars Ehlers:
Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets. 536 - Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta:
Purchase History and Product Personalization. 537 - Kimon Drakopoulos, Irene Lo, Justin A. Mulvany:
Blockchain Mediated Persuasion. 538 - Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz:
Ambiguous Contracts. 539 - Naveen Durvasula, Nika Haghtalab, Manolis Zampetakis:
Smoothed Analysis of Online Non-parametric Auctions. 540-560 - Paul Dütting, Evangelia Gergatsouli, Rojin Rezvan, Yifeng Teng, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis:
Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal. 561-581 - Ran Eilat, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan:
Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections. 582 - Farbod Ekbatani, Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh:
Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual. 583 - Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub, Mathieu V. Leduc:
Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility. 584 - Yuri Faenza, Swati Gupta, Xuan Zhang:
Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets. 585 - Gwendolyn Farach-Colton, Martin Farach-Colton, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Hanna Komlós, John Lapinskas, Reut Levi, Moti Medina, Miguel A. Mosteiro:
Graph Ranking and the Cost of Sybil Defense. 586-625 - Uriel Feige, Xin Huang:
On picking sequences for chores. 626-655 - Qing Feng, Ruihao Zhu, Stefanus Jasin:
Temporal Fairness in Learning and Earning: Price Protection Guarantee and Phase Transitions. 656 - Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality. 657-677 - Giannis Fikioris, Éva Tardos:
Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions. 678-698 - Simon Finster, Michelle González Amador, Edwin Lock, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Evi Micha, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing. 699 - Bailey Flanigan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Sven Wang:
Distortion Under Public-Spirited Voting. 700 - Daniel Freund, Thodoris Lykouris, Elisabeth Paulson, Bradley Sturt, Wentao Weng:
Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignment. 701 - Rafael M. Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner:
Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals. 702-733 - Rafael M. Frongillo:
Quantum Information Elicitation. 734 - Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu:
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria. 735 - Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg:
Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests. 736 - Francesco Giovannoni, Toomas Hinnosaar:
Pricing Novel Goods. 737 - Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah:
Best of Both Distortion Worlds. 738-758 - Sumit Goel:
Prizes and effort in contests with private information. 759 - Denizalp Goktas, Jiayi Zhao, Amy Greenwald:
Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets. 760-781 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas:
Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions. 782 - Mohak Goyal, Geoffrey Ramseyer, Ashish Goel, David Mazières:
Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers. 783-812 - Ronen Gradwohl, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky:
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. 813 - Lukas Graf, Tobias Harks:
Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria. 814 - Aram Grigoryan, Markus Möller:
A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms. 815 - Wenshuo Guo, Nika Haghtalab, Kirthevasan Kandasamy, Ellen Vitercik:
Leveraging Reviews: Learning to Price with Buyer and Seller Uncertainty. 816 - Swati Gupta, Jai Moondra, Mohit Singh:
Which Lp norm is the fairest? Approximations for fair facility location across all "p". 817 - Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua R. Wang, Junyao Zhao:
The Power of Menus in Contract Design. 818-848 - Isa Emin Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, M. Bumin Yenmez:
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives. 849 - Minseon Park, Dong Woo Hahm:
Location Choice, Commuting, and School Choice. 850 - Rustamdjan Hakimov, Renke Schmacker, Camille Terrier:
Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention. 851 - Daniel Halpern, Joseph Y. Halpern, Ali Jadbabaie, Elchanan Mossel, Ariel D. Procaccia, Manon Revel:
In Defense of Liquid Democracy. 852 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Aditya Saraf:
Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased Agents. 853-884 - Qishen Han, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao, Lirong Xia:
The Wisdom of Strategic Voting. 885-905 - Lin Hu, Anqi Li, Xu Tan:
A Rational Inattention Theory of Echo Chamber. 906 - Shan Huang, Chen Wang, Yuan Yuan, Jinglong Zhao, Jingjing Zhang:
Estimating Effects of Long-Term Treatments. 907 - Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi:
A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. 908 - Jiashuo Jiang, Will Ma, Jiawei Zhang:
Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet Inequalities. 909 - Yizhou Jin:
Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto Insurance. 910 - Zi Yang Kang:
Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities. 911 - T. Tony Ke, Song Lin, Michelle Y. Lu:
Information Design of Online Platforms. 912 - Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe:
Generalized Veto Core and a Practical Voting Rule with Optimal Metric Distortion. 913-936 - Andreas Kleiner:
Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World. 937 - Max Klimm, Maximilian J. Stahlberg:
Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. 938-955 - Andrew Kloosterman, Peter Troyan:
Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment. 956 - Haruki Kono, Kota Saito, Alec Sandroni:
Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable Alternatives. 957 - Giacomo Lanzani:
Dynamic Concern for Misspecification. 958 - Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng, Pratik Worah:
Description Complexity of Regular Distributions. 959 - Tesary Lin, Avner Strulov-Shlain:
Choice Architecture, Privacy Valuations, and Selection Bias in Consumer Data. 960 - Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid:
Predicting Choice from Information Costs. 961 - Will Ma:
Order-optimal Correlated Rounding for Fulfilling Multi-item E-commerce Orders. 962 - Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Kangning Wang:
Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations. 963 - Ivan-Aleksandar Mavrov, Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen:
Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constraints. 964-990 - Bryce McLaughlin, Jann Spiess:
Algorithmic Assistance with Recommendation-Dependent Preferences. 991 - Evan Munro, David Jones, Jennifer Brennan, Roland Nelet, Vahab Mirrokni, Jean Pouget-Abadie:
Causal Estimation of User Learning in Personalized Systems. 992-1016 - Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto:
A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. 1017 - Eren Ozbay, Vijay Kamble:
Incentives for Exploration at Market Equilibrium. 1018 - Mallesh M. Pai, Philipp Strack:
Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor. 1019 - Mikhail Panov:
Agreements of Continuous-Time Games. 1020-1044 - Christos H. Papadimitriou, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Manolis Zampetakis:
The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed Points. 1045 - Harry Pei:
Reputation Effects under Short Memories. 1046 - Georgios Piliouras, Fang-Yi Yu:
Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaos. 1047-1074 - Marek Pycia, Kyle Woodward:
Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design. 1075 - Kiran Rokade, Francesca Parise:
Graphon Games with Multiple Equilibria: Analysis and Computation. 1076 - Joseph Root, Sophie Bade:
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching. 1077 - Yanqiu Ruan, Xiaobo Li, Karthyek Murthy, Karthik Natarajan:
A Nonparametric Approach with Marginals for Modeling Consumer Choice. 1078 - Jan Christoph Schlegel, Mateusz Kwasnicki, Akaki Mamageishvili:
Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers. 1079 - Shuting Shen, Xi Chen, Ethan X. Fang, Junwei Lu:
Combinatorial Inference on the Optimal Assortment in the Multinomial Logit Model. 1080 - Suho Shin, Keivan Rezaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi:
Delegating to Multiple Agents. 1081-1126 - Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Richard J. Zeckhauser:
Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences. 1127 - Rajan Udwani:
Adwords with Unknown Budgets and Beyond. 1128 - Vignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick:
A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank Valuations. 1129-1152 - Jingyan Wang, Ashwin Pananjady:
Modeling and Correcting Bias in Sequential Evaluation. 1153 - Zichang Wang:
Regret and Information Avoidance. 1154 - Xiaowei Wu, Cong Zhang, Shengwei Zhou:
Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores. 1155 - Lirong Xia:
The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections. 1156 - Yangge Xiao, Zhenyu Hu, Shouqiang Wang:
Information Design of a Delegated Search. 1157 - Kai-Hao Yang, Alexander Zentefis:
Extreme Points and First-Order Stochastic Dominance: Theory and Applications. 1158 - Luyi Yang, Chen Jin, Zhen Shao:
Help and Haggle: Social Commerce Through Randomized, All-or-Nothing Discounts. 1159 - Zikun Ye, Zhiqi Zhang, Dennis J. Zhang, Heng Zhang, Renyu Zhang:
Deep Learning Based Causal Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical Evidence. 1160 - Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer:
Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation. 1161-1186 - Kun Zhang:
Withholding Verifiable Information. 1187 - Banghua Zhu, Stephen Bates, Zhuoran Yang, Yixin Wang, Jiantao Jiao, Michael I. Jordan:
The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design. 1188
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