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ORCID25th ACM-EC 2024: New Haven, CT, USA
- Dirk Bergemann, Robert Kleinberg, Daniela Sabán:
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2024, New Haven, CT, USA, July 8-11, 2024. ACM 2024, ISBN 979-8-4007-0704-9 - Chiwei Yan, Julia Yan, Yifan Shen:
Pricing Shared Rides. 1 - Daniel Freund, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao:
On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in Platforms. 2 - Kostas Bimpikis, Giacomo Mantegazza, Salomón Wollenstein-Betech:
Market Fragmentation and Inefficiencies in Maritime Shipping. 3 - Alfredo Torrico, Natthawut Boonsiriphatthanajaroen, Nikhil Garg, Andrea Lodi, Hugo Mainguy:
Equitable Congestion Pricing under the Markovian Traffic Model: An Application to Bogota. 4 - Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Algorithmic Cheap Talk. 5-6 - Junya Zhou, Collin Raymond:
Complexity, Communication and Misrepresentation. 7-10 - Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala:
A belief-based approach to signaling. 11 - Thomas Brzustowski:
Encouraging a Go-Getter. 12 - Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender, Themistoklis Melissourgos:
Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets. 13-39 - Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta, Tianlong Nan:
Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm. 40 - Eric Balkanski, Christopher En, Yuri Faenza:
An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive Valuations. 41 - Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability. 42 - Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu:
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions. 43 - Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto:
As-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms. 44 - Victor Augias, Eduardo Perez-Richet:
Non-Market Screening with Investment. 45-46 - Piotr Dworczak, Ellen V. Muir:
A mechanism-design approach to property rights. 47-48 - Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. 49 - Théo Delemazure, Dominik Peters:
Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences. 50 - Adrian Haret, Sophie Klumper, Jan Maly, Guido Schäfer:
Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting Games. 51-70 - José Correa, Paul Gölz, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Victor Verdugo:
Monotone Randomized Apportionment. 71 - Shipra Agrawal, Wei Tang:
Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Long-term Reference Effects. 72 - Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas A. Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium. 73-74 - Renato Paes Leme, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Kelly Spendlove, Song Zuo:
Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems. 75-100 - Khashayar Khosravi, Renato Paes Leme, Chara Podimata, Apostolis Tsorvantzis:
Preferences Evolve and so Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms. 101 - Jeffrey Ely, Benjamin Golub, Annie Liang, Chaofeng Wu:
Managing Strategic Complexity. 102 - David Almog, Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, Daniel Martin:
AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court. 103-105 - Luca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation. 106-107 - Aadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline, Atanu R. Sinha, Matthew vonAllmen:
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design. 108-135 - Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms. 136-158 - Will Ma, Calum MacRury, Pranav Nuti:
Online Matching and Contention Resolution for Edge Arrivals with Vanishing Probabilities. 159 - Simon Jantschgi:
The Hidden Cost of `Zero-Commission';. 160 - Jonathan Libgober, Beatrice Michaeli, Elyashiv Wiedman:
With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm Disclosures. 161 - Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev:
Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition. 162-163 - Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Paul Duetting, Federico Fusco:
Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective. 164-194 - Moshe Babaioff, Amitai Frey, Noam Nisan:
Learning to Maximize Gains From Trade in Small Markets. 195 - Riddhiman Bhattacharya, Thanh Nguyen, Will Wei Sun, Mohit Tawarmalani:
Active Learning for Fair and Stable Online Allocations. 196-197 - Hannaneh Akrami, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Setareh Taki:
Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin Share. 198 - S. Rasoul Etesami:
Multi-item Resource Allocation for Maximizing Social Welfare under Network Externalities. 199-200 - Ozan Candogan, Yiding Feng:
Mobility Data in Operations: Multi-Location Facility Location Problem. 201 - Sarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Madry:
User Strategization and Trustworthy Algorithms. 202 - Sarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Jennifer Allen, Hannah Li, Aleksander Madry:
Measuring Strategization in Recommendation: Users Adapt Their Behavior to Shape Future Content. 203-204 - Francisco Castro, Jian Gao, Sébastien Martin:
Human-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls. 205 - Tommaso Bondi, Omid Rafieian, Yunfei (Jesse) Yao:
Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework. 206-207 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yoram Moses:
Common Knowledge, Regained. 208 - Francesco Fabbri, Sofia Moroni:
Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational Asymmetries. 209 - Franz Ostrizek, Elia Sartori:
Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency. 210-211 - Martin Bullinger, Sonja Kraiczy:
Stability in Random Hedonic Games. 212 - Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to Coalitions. 213-238 - Yunduan Lin, Heng Zhang, Renyu Zhang, Zuo-Jun Max Shen:
Nonprogressive Diffusion on Social Networks: Approximation and Applications. 239 - Harry Pei:
Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records. 240 - Do Yoon Kim, Benjamin Knight, Dmitry Mitrofanov:
How effective is the High Stock Delivery Windows Information Sharing Policy for Online Platforms. 241 - Shai Vardi, Chris Parker:
Ex-Post Equilibrium Market Recommendations. 242 - Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation. 243 - Divya Singhvi, Somya Singhvi, Xinyu Zhang:
A Data-driven Approach to Improve Artisans' Productivity in Distributed Supply Chains. 244-245 - Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Optimal Stopping with Interdependent Values. 246-265 - Liyan Chen, Nuozhou Sun, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Setting Targets is All You Need: Improved Order Competitive Ratio for Online Selection. 263-277 - Alexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi:
Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource Allocation. 278 - Zhihao Gavin Tang, Yuhao Zhang:
Improved Bounds for Fractional Online Matching Problems. 279-307 - Allen Sirolly, Yash Kanoria, Hongyao Ma:
The Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and Merit. 308 - Zhi Liu, Nikhil Garg:
Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government Operations. 309 - Carlos Bonet, Nick Arnosti, Jay Sethuraman:
Explainable Affirmative Action. 310 - Diego Gentile Passaro, Fuhito Kojima, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson:
Equal Pay for Similar Work. 311 - Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli:
Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions. 312 - Hang Jiang, Chen Jin, Luyi Yang:
Revisiting the First-Order-Approach to Principal-Agent Problems. 313-314 - Yurong Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Zhiyi Huang:
Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal? 315-344 - Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii:
Monitoring with Rich Data. 345 - Daniel Freund, Wentao Weng:
The Dedicated Docket in U.S. Immigration Courts: An analysis of fairness and efficiency properties. 346 - Cynthia Dwork, Chris Hays, Jon M. Kleinberg, Manish Raghavan:
Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and Opportunity. 347-371 - Oguzhan Celebi:
Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules. 372 - Felipe Simon, Nick Arnosti:
Target the vulnerable? An analysis of rapid rehousing prioritization. 373 - Wenji Xu:
Social Learning through Action-Signals. 374 - Jackie Baek, Atanas Dinev, Thodoris Lykouris:
Social Learning with Bounded Rationality: Negative Reviews Persist under Newest First. 375 - Wanying Huang:
Learning about Informativeness. 376 - Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He:
Learning from Viral Content. 377 - Zaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Adam Wierman:
Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games. 378 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Charalampos Kokkalis:
On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions. 379-399 - Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Giacomo Lanzani, Roberto Corrao:
Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications. 400 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos:
A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion Games. 401-413 - Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urraca:
Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 414-415 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas:
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis. 416-417 - Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Stable Matching as Transportation. 418 - Mariagrazia Cavallo, Battal Dogan:
When Geography Shapes Preferences: Redesigning Teacher Assignment in Italy. 419 - Mahsa Derakhshan, Emily Ryu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue:
Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items. 420-446 - Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym:
Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets. 447 - Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. 448-464 - Linda Cai, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier:
Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors. 465 - Aaron Roth, Mirah Shi:
Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agents. 466-488 - Atulya Jain, Vianney Perchet:
Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion. 489 - Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider:
Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games. 490-510 - Natalie Collina, Aaron Roth, Han Shao:
Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents. 511-541 - Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. 542 - Kameng Nip, Changjun Wang:
Duopoly Assortment Competition under the Multinomial Logit Model: Simultaneous vs. Sequential. 543 - Peng Shi:
The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided Marketplace. 544 - Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization. 545-546 - Jan Knoepfle, Juia Salmi:
Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad. 547 - Kailin Chen:
Learning from Strategic Sources. 548-572 - Tommaso Denti, Doron Ravid:
Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention. 573 - Jan Knoepfle:
Dynamic Competition for Attention. 574 - Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui:
Full Dynamic Implementation. 575-576 - Yilun Chen, Jiaqi Lu:
Managing Newsvendors: A Demand Mechanism. 577 - Chen Chen, Yilun Chen, Pengyu Qian:
Incentivizing Resource Pooling. 578-579 - Marco Scarsini, Eran Shmaya:
Optimal Queueing Regimes. 580 - Yan Leng:
Can LLMs Mimic Human-Like Mental Accounting and Behavioral Biases? 581 - Yuxuan Lu, Shengwei Xu, Yichi Zhang, Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck:
Eliciting Informative Text Evaluations with Large Language Models. 582-612 - James Brand, Ayelet Israeli, Donald Ngwe:
Using GPT for Market Research. 613 - Apostolos Filippas, John J. Horton, Benjamin S. Manning:
Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus? 614-615 - Alireza Fallah, Michael Jordan:
Contract Design With Safety Inspections. 616-638 - Yingkai Li, Jonathan Libgober:
Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition. 639 - Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth:
Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability. 640-668 - Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. 669-670 - Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Emily Ryu, Éva Tardos:
Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice. 671-672 - Kirk Bansak, Soonbong Lee, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Elisabeth Paulson:
Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement. 673 - Irene Lo, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, Ali Shameli:
Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement. 674 - Kenny Peng, Nikhil Garg:
Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets. 675 - Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu:
Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols. 676-702 - Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. 703 - Eric Budish, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Tim Roughgarden:
The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus. 704-731 - Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis, Kshitij Kulkarni, Alex Evans:
The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers. 732 - Fabian Raoul Pieroth, Martin Bichler:
Alpha-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities. 733 - Tomás Masarík, Grzegorz Pierczynski, Piotr Skowron:
A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making. 734-754 - Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters, Tomasz Was:
The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings. 755 - Carmel Baharav, Bailey Flanigan:
Fair, Manipulation-Robust, and Transparent Sortition. 756-775 - Jinglong Zhao:
Adaptive Neyman Allocation. 776 - Chen Wang, Shichao Han, Shan Huang:
Enhancing External Validity in Experiments with Ongoing Sampling. 777 - Anya Shchetkina, Ron Berman:
When Is Heterogeneity Actionable for Targeting? 778-779 - Shuangning Li, Ramesh Johari, Kuang Xu, Stefan Wager:
Experimenting under Stochastic Congestion. 780 - Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang:
Sample-Based Matroid Prophet Inequalities. 781 - Vasilis Livanos, Kalen Patton, Sahil Singla:
Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies. 782-805 - Andrés Cristi, Sigal Oren:
Planning against a prophet: a graph-theoretic framework for making sequential decisions. 806 - Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo:
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. 807-830 - Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler:
Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experiment. 831-832 - Benjamin Knight, Dmitry Mitrofanov, Serguei Netessine:
The Impact of AI Technology on the Productivity of Gig Economy Workers. 833 - Enrique Ide, Eduard Talamàs:
Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy. 834-836 - Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urraca:
The Effects of Self-Advertising in a Labor Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 837-838 - Simone Galperti, Tianhao Liu, Jacopo Perego:
Competitive Markets for Personal Data. 839 - Yanwei Sun, Niloofar Zamani Foroushani, Zhe Liu, Jiahua Wu:
Information Design and Pricing of Supply Competition in Lead-Selling Platforms. 840 - Qinzhen Li, Yifan Feng, Hongfan (Kevin) Chen:
Learning to Rank under Strategic "Brush Wars". 841 - Shreyas Sekar, Auyon Siddiq:
Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing Remedies. 842 - Yiqi Liu, Francesca Molinari:
Inference for an Algorithmic Fairness-Accuracy Frontier. 843 - Christopher Turansick:
An Alternative Approach for Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility Models. 844 - Peter Caradonna:
Preference Regression. 845-848 - Haitian Xie, Ying Zhu, Denis Shishkin:
On the limitations of data-based price discrimination. 849-850 - Tan Gan, Nicholas T. Wu:
From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing. 851 - Andreas Alexander Haupt, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Certification Design for a Competitive Market. 852 - Tan Gan, Hongcheng Li:
Robust Advertisement Pricing. 853-854 - Doron Ravid, Jeffrey Mensch:
Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning. 855 - Matteo Bizzarri:
Supply and demand function competition in input-output networks. 856 - Gaurab Aryal, Charles Murry, Pallavi Pal, Arnab Palit:
Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband Procurement. 857-858 - Yihao Yuan:
Exclusive Contracts in the Video Streaming Market. 859-862 - Cornelius Fritz, Co-Pierre Georg, Angelo Mele, Michael Schweinberger:
A Strategic Model of Software Dependency Networks. 863-892 - Rachitesh Kumar, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions. 893 - Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao:
Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions. 894-921 - Sahil Singla, Yifan Wang:
Bandit Sequential Posted Pricing via Half-Concavity. 922-939 - Joon Suk Huh, Ellen Vitercik, Kirthevasan Kandasamy:
Bandit Profit-Maximization for Targeted Marketing. 940 - Daniel Halpern, Safwan Hossain, Jamie Tucker-Foltz:
Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes. 941-963 - Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen:
Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Voting. 964-983 - Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p, q)-Veto Core. 984 - Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich:
Generative Social Choice. 985 - Geoffrey Ramseyer, Mohak Goyal, Ashish Goel, David Mazières:
Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers. 986-1016 - Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Undetectable Selfish Mining. 1017-1044 - Hao Chung, Tim Roughgarden, Elaine Shi:
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. 1045-1073 - Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish:
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms. 1074-1096 - Sofoklis Goulas, Faidra Monachou:
Optimal Cohort Partitions. 1097 - Arthur Delarue, Zhen Lian, Sébastien Martin:
Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules. 1098 - Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken:
Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation. 1099 - Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes:
GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning. 1100 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets. 1101 - Greg d'Eon, Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Understanding Iterative Combinatorial Auction Designs via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. 1102-1130 - Yuqing Kong, Shu Wang, Ying Wang:
The Surprising Benefits of Base Rate Neglect in Robust Aggregation. 1131 - Fupeng Sun, Yanwei Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin:
Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests. 1132 - Pavel Atanasov, Ezra Karger, Philip Tetlock:
Full Accuracy Scoring Accelerates the Discovery of Skilled Forecasters. 1133 - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis:
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model. 1134-1154 - Pinyan Lu, Zongqi Wan, Jialin Zhang:
Competitive Auctions with Imperfect Predictions. 1155-1183 - Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu:
Online Mechanism Design with Predictions. 1184 - Victor Augias, Daniel M. A. Barreto, Alexis Ghersengorin:
Redistribution through Market Segmentation. 1185-1186 - Francisco Castro, Scott Rodilitz:
Optimal Design of Default Donations. 1187 - Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Michael C. Wang:
A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination. 1188 - Madhav Kumar, Pedro Silva, Ashudeep Singh, Abhay Varmaraja:
Inclusive Recommendations and User Engagement: Experimental Evidence from Pinterest. 1189-1191 - Shan Huang, Yi Ji:
Algorithmic vs. Friend-based Recommendations in Shaping Novel Content Engagement: A Large-scale Field Experiment. 1192 - Sebastián D. Bauer, Florencia M. Hnilo:
Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy Concerns. 1193 - Martino Banchio, Suraj Malladi:
Search and Rediscovery. 1194 - Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Decomposable Stochastic Choice. 1195 - Jeffrey Mensch, Komal Malik:
Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition. 1196 - Zihao Li, Jonathan Libgober:
The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality. 1197 - Laura Doval, Ran Eilat:
The Core of Bayesian persuasion. 1198-1199 - Yonatan Gur, Anand Kalvit, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Incentivized Exploration via Filtered Posterior Sampling. 1200 - Xiaoyu Cheng, Peter Klibanoff, Sujoy Mukerji, Ludovic Renou:
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication. 1201-1202 - Zhicheng Du, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang:
Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders. 1203 - Ruohan Zhan, Shichao Han, Yuchen Hu, Zhenling Jiang:
Estimating Treatment Effects under Recommender Interference: A Structured Neural Networks Approach. 1204 - Jacob Goldin, Julian Nyarko, Justin Young:
Forecasting Algorithms for Causal Inference with Panel Data. 1205 - Walter Zhang, Sanjog Misra:
Coarse Personalization. 1206-1208 - Yuchen Hu, Henry Zhu, Emma Brunskil, Stefan Wager:
Minimax-Regret Sample Selection in Randomized Experiments. 1209-1235 - Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka:
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. 1236-1266 - Owen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
On the Fairness of Normalized $p$-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores. 1267 - Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations. 1268-1286 - Gerdus Benade, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations. 1287 - Kenzo Imamura, Yasushi Kawase:
Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General Constraints. 1288 - Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym:
Equilibrium in Pseudomarkets. 1289 - Kenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando, Tomoya Kazumura:
Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited. 1290 - Afshin Nikzad:
Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics. 1291 - Jeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Luis Rayo:
Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard. 1292 - Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti:
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions. 1293 - Bo Peng, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Optimal Robust Contract Design. 1294 - Wade Hann-Caruthers, Sumit Goel:
Optimality of Weighted Contracts for Multi-agent Contract Design with a Budget. 1295
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