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2020 – today
- 2024
[c35]Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo:
Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. ICALP 2024: 44:1-44:18- [c34]Yuan Deng
, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, Song Zuo:
Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers. WWW 2024: 46-56 - [c33]Paul Dütting, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo:
Mechanism Design for Large Language Models. WWW 2024: 144-155 - [c32]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Yifeng Teng, Song Zuo:
Non-uniform Bid-scaling and Equilibria for Different Auctions: An Empirical Study. WWW 2024: 256-266 - [i22]Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo:
A Reduction from Multi-Parameter to Single-Parameter Bayesian Contract Design. CoRR abs/2404.03476 (2024) - [i21]Renato Paes Leme, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Kelly Spendlove, Song Zuo:
Dynamical Analysis of Autobidding Systems. CoRR abs/2406.19350 (2024) - [i20]Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng, Zhe Feng, Gagan Goel, Christopher Liaw, Haihao Lu, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Andrés Perlroth, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng, Di Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Mingfei Zhao, Wennan Zhu, Song Zuo:
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey. CoRR abs/2408.07685 (2024) - 2023
- [j3]Shihan Qiu, Chengfei Li, Yue Feng, Song Zuo, Huijie Liang, Ao Xu:
GFANet: Gated Fusion Attention Network for skin lesion segmentation. Comput. Biol. Medicine 155: 106462 (2023) - [c31]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, Song Zuo:
Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs. WWW 2023: 3428-3435 - [i19]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, Song Zuo:
Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs. CoRR abs/2302.00377 (2023) - [i18]Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo:
Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auction. CoRR abs/2306.06554 (2023) - [i17]Yuan Deng, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, Song Zuo:
Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers. CoRR abs/2310.03105 (2023) - [i16]Paul Duetting, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo:
Mechanism Design for Large Language Models. CoRR abs/2310.10826 (2023) - [i15]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Yifeng Teng, Song Zuo:
Non-uniform Bid-scaling and Equilibria for Different Auctions: An Empirical Study. CoRR abs/2311.10679 (2023) - 2022
- [j2]Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo:
Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best. Oper. Res. 70(4): 2299-2317 (2022) - [c30]Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping. EC 2022: 475 - [c29]Dirk Bergemann, Paul Dütting, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo:
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. WWW 2022: 47-57 - [i14]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, Song Zuo:
Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World. CoRR abs/2208.10650 (2022) - 2021
- [c28]Yuan Deng, Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing. ICML 2021: 2601-2610 - [c27]Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World. NeurIPS 2021: 17777-17788 - [c26]Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization. EC 2021: 132-133 - [c25]Yuan Deng, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond. EC 2021: 369 - [c24]Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo:
Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design. SODA 2021: 1357-1373 - [c23]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World. WWW 2021: 3965-3973 - [i13]Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World. CoRR abs/2103.13356 (2021) - [i12]Dirk Bergemann, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo:
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach. CoRR abs/2105.09375 (2021) - [i11]Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World. CoRR abs/2111.02468 (2021) - 2020
- [c22]Zihe Wang, Weiran Shen, Song Zuo:
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions. AAMAS 2020: 1458-1466 - [c21]Yuan Deng, Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
A Data-Driven Metric of Incentive Compatibility. WWW 2020: 1796-1806
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c20]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers. AAAI 2019: 2125-2132 - [c19]Binghui Peng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Learning Optimal Strategies to Commit To. AAAI 2019: 2149-2156 - [c18]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networks. AAMAS 2019: 215-223 - [c17]Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Dispatching Through Pricing: Modeling Ride-Sharing and Designing Dynamic Prices. IJCAI 2019: 165-171 - [c16]Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo:
Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best. SODA 2019: 157-172 - [c15]Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo:
The Matthew Effect in Computation Contests: High Difficulty May Lead to 51% Dominance? WWW 2019: 2281-2289 - [i10]Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo:
The Matthew Effect in Computation Contests: High Difficulty May Lead to 51% Dominance. CoRR abs/1902.09089 (2019) - [i9]Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo:
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions. CoRR abs/1906.09403 (2019) - 2018
- [c14]Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo:
Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-action Payments. AAMAS 2018: 2076-2078 - [c13]Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo:
Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments. IJCAI 2018: 505-511 - [c12]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design. EC 2018: 169 - [c11]Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Vehicle Dispatching for Ride-sharing Platforms via Dynamic Pricing. WWW (Companion Volume) 2018: 51-52 - [c10]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Rita Ren, Song Zuo:
Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field. WWW 2018: 1359-1368 - [c9]Alessandro Epasto, Mohammad Mahdian, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Incentive-Aware Learning for Large Markets. WWW 2018: 1369-1378 - [i8]Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Computer-aided mechanism design: designing revenue-optimal mechanisms via neural networks. CoRR abs/1805.03382 (2018) - [i7]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers. CoRR abs/1812.02993 (2018) - 2017
- [c8]Pingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo:
Fans Economy and All-Pay Auctions with Proportional Allocations. AAAI 2017: 713-719 - [c7]Santiago R. Balseiro, Max Lin, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo:
Dynamic Revenue Sharing. NIPS 2017: 2681-2689 - [i6]Mengjing Chen, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal Vehicle Dispatching Schemes via Dynamic Pricing. CoRR abs/1707.01625 (2017) - [i5]Song Zuo:
Generalizing Virtual Values to Multidimensional Auctions: a Non-Myersonian Approach. CoRR abs/1711.10922 (2017) - 2016
- [c6]Wenyi Fang, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Digital Good Exchange: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1277-1278 - [c5]Wenyi Fang, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Digital Good Exchange. IJCAI 2016: 264-270 - [c4]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Dynamic Auctions with Bank Accounts. IJCAI 2016: 387-393 - [i4]Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts. CoRR abs/1605.08840 (2016) - 2015
- [c3]Song Zuo, Pingzhong Tang:
Optimal Machine Strategies to Commit to in Two-Person Repeated Games. AAAI 2015: 1071-1078 - [c2]Wenyi Fang, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo:
Randomized Assignments for Barter Exchanges: Fairness vs. Efficiency. ADT 2015: 537-552 - 2014
- [c1]Andris Ambainis, Mohammad Bavarian, Yihan Gao, Jieming Mao, Xiaoming Sun, Song Zuo:
Tighter Relations between Sensitivity and Other Complexity Measures. ICALP (1) 2014: 101-113 - [i3]Andris Ambainis, Mohammad Bavarian, Yihan Gao, Jieming Mao, Xiaoming Sun, Song Zuo:
Tighter Relations Between Sensitivity and Other Complexity Measures. CoRR abs/1411.3419 (2014) - [i2]Andris Ambainis, Mohammad Bavarian, Yihan Gao, Jieming Mao, Xiaoming Sun, Song Zuo:
Tighter Relations Between Sensitivity and Other Complexity Measures. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR14 (2014) - 2013
- [j1]Yihan Gao, Jieming Mao, Xiaoming Sun, Song Zuo:
On the sensitivity complexity of bipartite graph properties. Theor. Comput. Sci. 468: 83-91 (2013) - [i1]Andris Ambainis, Yihan Gao, Jieming Mao, Xiaoming Sun, Song Zuo:
New upper bound on block sensitivity and certificate complexity in terms of sensitivity. CoRR abs/1306.4466 (2013)
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-10-07 22:16 CEST by the dblp team
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