"The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs."

Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer (2021)

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DOI: 10.1145/3434408

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2021-05-11

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Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer:
The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 9(1): 6:1-6:35 (2021)

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