- Carmel Baharav, Bailey Flanigan:
Fair, Manipulation-Robust, and Transparent Sortition. EC 2024: 756-775 - Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Undetectable Selfish Mining. EC 2024: 1017-1044 - Eric Balkanski, Christopher En, Yuri Faenza:
An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive Valuations. EC 2024: 41 - Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu:
Online Mechanism Design with Predictions. EC 2024: 1184 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets. EC 2024: 1101 - Martino Banchio, Suraj Malladi:
Search and Rediscovery. EC 2024: 1194 - Kirk Bansak, Soonbong Lee, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Elisabeth Paulson:
Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee Resettlement. EC 2024: 673 - Sebastián D. Bauer, Florencia M. Hnilo:
Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy Concerns. EC 2024: 1193 - Gerdus Benade, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations. EC 2024: 1287 - Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Michael C. Wang:
A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination. EC 2024: 1188 - Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p, q)-Veto Core. EC 2024: 984 - Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli:
Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions. EC 2024: 312 - Riddhiman Bhattacharya, Thanh Nguyen, Will Wei Sun, Mohit Tawarmalani:
Active Learning for Fair and Stable Online Allocations. EC 2024: 196-197 - Kostas Bimpikis, Giacomo Mantegazza, Salomón Wollenstein-Betech:
Market Fragmentation and Inefficiencies in Maritime Shipping. EC 2024: 3 - Matteo Bizzarri:
Supply and demand function competition in input-output networks. EC 2024: 856 - Tommaso Bondi, Omid Rafieian, Yunfei (Jesse) Yao:
Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based Framework. EC 2024: 206-207 - Carlos Bonet, Nick Arnosti, Jay Sethuraman:
Explainable Affirmative Action. EC 2024: 310 - James Brand, Ayelet Israeli, Donald Ngwe:
Using GPT for Market Research. EC 2024: 613 - Alexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi:
Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource Allocation. EC 2024: 278 - Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo:
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. EC 2024: 807-830 - Thomas Brzustowski:
Encouraging a Go-Getter. EC 2024: 12 - Eric Budish, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Tim Roughgarden:
The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus. EC 2024: 704-731 - Martin Bullinger, Sonja Kraiczy:
Stability in Random Hedonic Games. EC 2024: 212 - Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti:
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions. EC 2024: 1293 - Linda Cai, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier:
Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors. EC 2024: 465 - Ozan Candogan, Yiding Feng:
Mobility Data in Operations: Multi-Location Facility Location Problem. EC 2024: 201 - Peter Caradonna:
Preference Regression. EC 2024: 845-848 - Luca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation. EC 2024: 106-107 - Francisco Castro, Jian Gao, Sébastien Martin:
Human-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls. EC 2024: 205 - Francisco Castro, Scott Rodilitz:
Optimal Design of Default Donations. EC 2024: 1187