• case-insensitive prefix search: default
  e.g., sig matches "SIGIR" as well as "signal"
• exact word search: append dollar sign ($) to word
  e.g., graph$ matches "graph", but not "graphics"
• boolean and: separate words by space
  e.g., codd model
• boolean or: connect words by pipe symbol (|)
  e.g., graph|network

Update May 7, 2017: Please note that we had to disable the phrase search operator (.) and the boolean not operator (-) due to technical problems. For the time being, phrase search queries will yield regular prefix search result, and search terms preceded by a minus will be interpreted as regular (positive) search terms.

found 25 matches

• 2016
• 
  George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing:
  Price of Stability in Polynomial Congestion Games. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(2): 10:1-10:17 (2016)
• 
  George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang:
  Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First-Price Auctions. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(2): 9:1-9:33 (2016)
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(2): 7:1-7:48 (2016)
• 
  Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
  When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth? ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 15:1-15:30 (2016)
• 
  Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil P. Vadhan:
  Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 13:1-13:30 (2016)
• 
  Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
  Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 19:1 (2016)
• 
  Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan:
  Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 14:1-14:20 (2016)
• 
  David A. Easley, Arpita Ghosh:
  Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 16:1-16:26 (2016)
• 
  John Fearnley, Rahul Savani:
  Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 25:1-25:19 (2016)
• 
  Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Peysakhovich:
  Recency, Records, and Recaps: Learning and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 23:1-23:18 (2016)
• 
  Arpita Ghosh, Robert D. Kleinberg:
  Optimal Contest Design for Simple Agents. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 22:1-22:41 (2016)
• 
  Paul W. Goldberg, Aaron Roth:
  Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 24:1-24:25 (2016)
• 
  Avinatan Hassidim, Yishay Mansour, Shai Vardi:
  Local Computation Mechanism Design. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 21:1-21:24 (2016)
• 
  Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim, Berthold Vöcking:
  Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(2): 11:1-11:18 (2016)
• 
  R. Preston McAfee, Éva Tardos:
  Introduction. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 12:1 (2016)
• 
  Abraham Othman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein:
  The Complexity of Fairness Through Equilibrium. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(4): 20:1-20:19 (2016)
• 
  Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key:
  Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 17:1-17:21 (2016)
• 
  Tim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers:
  Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(2): 8:1-8:24 (2016)
• 
  Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
  Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(3): 18:1-18:34 (2016)
• 2015
• 
  Noga Alon, Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Stefan Kratsch, Rolf Niedermeier, Gerhard J. Woeginger:
  How to Put Through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(1): 5:1-5:28 (2015)
• 
  Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim:
  Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(1): 3:1-3:16 (2015)
• 
  Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger:
  On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(1): 2:1-2:34 (2015)
• 
  Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger:
  Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(1): 4:1-4:17 (2015)
• 
  Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber:
  An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(1): 1:1-1:34 (2015)
• 
  Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo:
  Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(1): 6:1-6:40 (2015)