• case-insensitive prefix search: default
  e.g., sig matches "SIGIR" as well as "signal"
• exact word search: append dollar sign ($) to word
  e.g., graph$ matches "graph", but not "graphics"
• boolean and: separate words by space
  e.g., codd model
• boolean or: connect words by pipe symbol (|)
  e.g., graph|network

Update May 7, 2017: Please note that we had to disable the phrase search operator (.) and the boolean not operator (-) due to technical problems. For the time being, phrase search queries will yield regular prefix search result, and search terms preceded by a minus will be interpreted as regular (positive) search terms.

found 75 matches

• 2013
• 
  Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff, Michael Grubb:
  Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information. EC 2013: 7-8
• 
  Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks. EC 2013: 9-24
• 
  Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
  Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools. EC 2013: 25-26
• 
  Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno:
  Unbalanced random matching markets. EC 2013: 27-28
• 
  Pablo Daniel Azar, Silvio Micali:
  Super-efficient rational proofs. EC 2013: 29-30
• 
  Eduardo M. Azevedo, John William Hatfield:
  Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementarities. EC 2013: 31-32
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
  Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation. EC 2013: 35-52
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
  Bertrand networks. EC 2013: 33-34
• 
  Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
  Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: approximations and design. EC 2013: 53-54
• 
  Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman:
  The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games. EC 2013: 55-72
• 
  Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala:
  Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method. EC 2013: 73-90
• 
  Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan Kulkarni, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Xiaoming Xu:
  Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders. EC 2013: 91-102
• 
  Aditya Bhave, Eric Budish:
  Primary-market auctions for event tickets: eliminating the rents of "Bob the broker". EC 2013: 141-142
• 
  Jose H. Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego, Vineet Goyal:
  A markov chain approximation to choice modeling. EC 2013: 103-104
• 
  Jeremiah Blocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet:
  Optimizing password composition policies. EC 2013: 105-122
• 
  Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ankit Sharma:
  Harnessing the power of two crossmatches. EC 2013: 123-140
• 
  Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
  When do noisy votes reveal the truth? EC 2013: 143-160
• 
  Gabriel D. Carroll:
  Robust incentives for information acquisition. EC 2013: 161-162
• 
  Denis Xavier Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lei Wang:
  Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions: a game theoretic approach. EC 2013: 163-180
• 
  Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline:
  Auctions with unique equilibria. EC 2013: 181-196
• 
  Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil P. Vadhan:
  Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy. EC 2013: 215-232
• 
  Yiling Chen, Mike Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
  Cost function market makers for measurable spaces. EC 2013: 785-802
• 
  Wei Chen, Yajun Wang, Dongxiao Yu, Li Zhang:
  Sybil-proof mechanisms in query incentive networks. EC 2013: 197-214
• 
  Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren:
  On discrete preferences and coordination. EC 2013: 233-250
• 
  Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel:
  Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments. EC 2013: 251-268
• 
  Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos:
  Mechanism design via optimal transport. EC 2013: 269-286
• 
  Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan:
  Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online bidders. EC 2013: 305-322
• 
  Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
  Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents. EC 2013: 287-304
• 
  John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Failure-aware kidney exchange. EC 2013: 323-340
• 
  Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, David M. Rothschild:
  A combinatorial prediction market for the U.S. elections. EC 2013: 341-358

skipping 45 more matches