- Owen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
On the Fairness of Normalized $p$-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores. EC 2024: 1267 - Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. EC 2024: 448-464 - Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. EC 2024: 542 - Jeffrey Ely, Benjamin Golub, Annie Liang, Chaofeng Wu:
Managing Strategic Complexity. EC 2024: 102 - Jeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Luis Rayo:
Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard. EC 2024: 1292 - S. Rasoul Etesami:
Multi-item Resource Allocation for Maximizing Social Welfare under Network Externalities. EC 2024: 199-200 - Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms. EC 2024: 136-158 - Francesco Fabbri, Sofia Moroni:
Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational Asymmetries. EC 2024: 209 - Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka:
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. EC 2024: 1236-1266 - Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu:
Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols. EC 2024: 676-702 - Apostolos Filippas, John J. Horton, Benjamin S. Manning:
Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus? EC 2024: 614-615 - Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urraca:
Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment. EC 2024: 414-415 - Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urraca:
The Effects of Self-Advertising in a Labor Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment. EC 2024: 837-838 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Charalampos Kokkalis:
On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions. EC 2024: 379-399 - Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich:
Generative Social Choice. EC 2024: 985 - Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii:
Monitoring with Rich Data. EC 2024: 345 - Cornelius Fritz, Co-Pierre Georg, Angelo Mele, Michael Schweinberger:
A Strategic Model of Software Dependency Networks. EC 2024: 863-892 - Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish:
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms. EC 2024: 1074-1096 - Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev:
Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition. EC 2024: 162-163 - Simone Galperti, Tianhao Liu, Jacopo Perego:
Competitive Markets for Personal Data. EC 2024: 839 - Tan Gan, Hongcheng Li:
Robust Advertisement Pricing. EC 2024: 853-854 - Tan Gan, Nicholas T. Wu:
From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing. EC 2024: 851 - Aadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline, Atanu R. Sinha, Matthew vonAllmen:
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism design. EC 2024: 108-135 - Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. EC 2024: 703 - Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to Coalitions. EC 2024: 213-238 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos:
A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion Games. EC 2024: 401-413 - Jacob Goldin, Julian Nyarko, Justin Young:
Forecasting Algorithms for Causal Inference with Panel Data. EC 2024: 1205 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas:
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis. EC 2024: 416-417 - Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yoram Moses:
Common Knowledge, Regained. EC 2024: 208 - Sofoklis Goulas, Faidra Monachou:
Optimal Cohort Partitions. EC 2024: 1097