- David Lagziel
, Ehud Lehrer:
Approachability with delayed information. J. Econ. Theory 157: 425-444 (2015) - Qingmin Liu:
Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information. J. Econ. Theory 157: 49-75 (2015) - David McAdams:
On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly. J. Econ. Theory 157: 959-972 (2015) - Jianjun Miao, Pengfei Wang:
Banking bubbles and financial crises. J. Econ. Theory 157: 763-792 (2015) - Philippe Mongin, Marcus Pivato:
Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects. J. Econ. Theory 157: 146-171 (2015) - Francesco Nava:
Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets. J. Econ. Theory 157: 315-348 (2015) - Jonathan Newton, Simon D. Angus:
Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution. J. Econ. Theory 157: 172-187 (2015) - Jonathan Newton, Ryoji Sawa:
A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. J. Econ. Theory 157: 1-27 (2015) - Amine Ouazad:
Blockbusting: Brokers and the dynamics of segregation. J. Econ. Theory 157: 811-841 (2015) - Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi:
Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games. J. Econ. Theory 157: 100-127 (2015) - Roberto Pinheiro, Ludo Visschers:
Unemployment risk and wage differentials. J. Econ. Theory 157: 397-424 (2015) - Alexander Reffgen:
Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. J. Econ. Theory 157: 349-383 (2015) - Andreas Schabert:
Optimal central bank lending. J. Econ. Theory 157: 485-516 (2015) - Rodrigo A. Velez:
Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market. J. Econ. Theory 157: 1114-1129 (2015) - Junjie Zhou, Ying-Ju Chen:
Key leaders in social networks. J. Econ. Theory 157: 212-235 (2015)
