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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 157
Volume 157, May 2015
- Jonathan Newton
, Ryoji Sawa:
A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. 1-27 - Andrew Kloosterman:
Public information in Markov games. 28-48 - Qingmin Liu:
Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information. 49-75 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Mich Tvede:
Minimum cost connection networks: Truth-telling and implementation. 76-99 - Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi:
Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games. 100-127 - Yves Guéron:
Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring. 128-145 - Philippe Mongin, Marcus Pivato:
Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects. 146-171
- Jonathan Newton, Simon D. Angus:
Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution. 172-187
- Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang:
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring. 188-211
- Junjie Zhou, Ying-Ju Chen:
Key leaders in social networks. 212-235
- Peter Borm, Yuan Ju, David Wettstein:
Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities. 236-254 - Daron Acemoglu, Dan Cao:
Innovation by entrants and incumbents. 255-294 - Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó:
Matching markets under (in)complete information. 295-314 - Francesco Nava:
Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets. 315-348 - Alexander Reffgen:
Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. 349-383 - Spyros Galanis:
The value of information under unawareness. 384-396 - Roberto Pinheiro, Ludo Visschers:
Unemployment risk and wage differentials. 397-424 - David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer:
Approachability with delayed information. 425-444 - David Dillenberger, Kareen Rozen:
History-dependent risk attitude. 445-477
- Daniel Göller, Michael Hewer:
Breakdown in multilateral negotiations. 478-484
- Andreas Schabert:
Optimal central bank lending. 485-516
- Simon P. Anderson, Levent Çelik:
Product line design. 517-526
- Nizar Allouch:
On the private provision of public goods on networks. 527-552 - Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci:
Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring. 553-605 - Frédéric Cherbonnier, Christian Gollier:
Decreasing aversion under ambiguity. 606-623 - Geoffroy de Clippel:
On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory. 624-647 - Simone Galperti:
Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals. 648-667 - Victor Couture:
Knowledge spillovers in cities: An auction approach. 668-698 - José Heleno Faro:
Variational Bewley preferences. 699-729 - Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci:
Put-Call Parity and market frictions. 730-762 - Jianjun Miao, Pengfei Wang:
Banking bubbles and financial crises. 763-792 - Luis Araujo, Bernardo Guimaraes:
Intertemporal coordination with delay options. 793-810 - Amine Ouazad:
Blockbusting: Brokers and the dynamics of segregation. 811-841 - Milo Bianchi, Philippe Jehiel:
Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors. 842-878 - Larry G. Epstein, Kyoungwon Seo:
Exchangeable capacities, parameters and incomplete theories. 879-917 - Dieter Balkenborg, Miltiadis Makris:
An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values. 918-958
- David McAdams:
On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly. 959-972
- Aaron M. Kolb:
Optimal entry timing. 973-1000 - Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian, Giuseppe Freni:
On the Mitra-Wan forest management problem in continuous time. 1001-1040 - Joyee Deb, Ehud Kalai:
Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players. 1041-1055 - Frédéric Dufourt, Kazuo Nishimura, Alain Venditti:
Indeterminacy and sunspots in two-sector RBC models with generalized no-income-effect preferences. 1056-1080 - Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller, Jürg Müller:
The macroeconomics of Modigliani-Miller. 1081-1113 - Rodrigo A. Velez:
Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market. 1114-1129 - Julien Hugonnier, Semyon Malamud, Erwan Morellec:
Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics. 1130-1158 - Robert Evans, Sönje Reiche:
Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation. 1159-1187
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