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2020 – today
- 2024
[j21]Tal Alon
, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash:
Technical Note - Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. Oper. Res. 72(1): 288-299 (2024)- [j20]Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi:
Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes. Math. Oper. Res. 49(2): 880-900 (2024) - 2023
- [c36]Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling:
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. AAAI 2023: 5608-5615 - 2022
- [j19]Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash:
Principal-agent VCG contracts. J. Econ. Theory 201: 105443 (2022) - [j18]Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar:
Redesigning Bitcoin's Fee Market. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 10(1): 5:1-5:31 (2022) - 2021
- [j17]Amir Ban, Ron Lavi:
Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations. Int. J. Game Theory 50(1): 75-104 (2021) - [j16]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 72: 99-135 (2021) - [c35]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. IJCAI 2021: 210-216 - [c34]Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. EC 2021: 70 - [c33]Ido Feldman, Ron Lavi:
Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post Vs. Ex-Interim IR. WINE 2021: 550 - [i13]Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. CoRR abs/2105.14998 (2021) - [i12]Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling:
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. CoRR abs/2107.13363 (2021) - [i11]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. CoRR abs/2108.09216 (2021) - [i10]Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. CoRR abs/2109.08671 (2021) - 2020
- [j15]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi:
Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency. J. ACM 67(1): 7:1-7:33 (2020) - [j14]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi:
Bayesian generalized network design. Theor. Comput. Sci. 841: 167-185 (2020) - [c32]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis. AAAI 2020: 1966-1973 - [c31]Ron Lavi, Omer Shiran-Shvarzbard:
Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis. IJCAI 2020: 378-385 - [c30]Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Qi Qi, Wenwei Wang, Xiang Yan:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. NeurIPS 2020 - [c29]Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi:
Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes. NeurIPS 2020 - [i9]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi:
No-Regret Stateful Posted Pricing. CoRR abs/2005.01869 (2020) - [i8]Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Qi Qi, Wenwei Wang, Xiang Yan:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. CoRR abs/2010.05519 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c28]Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash:
Principal-Agent VCG Contracts. EC 2019: 783 - [c27]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi:
Bayesian Generalized Network Design. ESA 2019: 45:1-45:16 - [c26]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, William K. Moses Jr.:
Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter. ICALP 2019: 140:1-140:14 - [c25]Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar:
Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market. WWW 2019: 2950-2956 - [i7]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, William K. Moses Jr.:
Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter. CoRR abs/1905.00580 (2019) - [i6]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi:
Bayesian Generalized Network Design. CoRR abs/1907.00484 (2019) - [i5]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
VCG Under Sybil (False-name) Attacks - a Bayesian Analysis. CoRR abs/1911.07210 (2019) - 2018
- [c24]Argyrios Deligkas, Erez Karpas, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky:
Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives. IJCAI 2018: 4743-4749 - [c23]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi:
Approximating generalized network design under (dis)economies of scale with applications to energy efficiency. STOC 2018: 598-606 - [i4]Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi:
Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency. CoRR abs/1803.05361 (2018) - 2017
- [i3]Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar:
Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market. CoRR abs/1709.08881 (2017) - 2016
- [j13]Martin Hoefer, Ron Lavi:
Preface to Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. Theory Comput. Syst. 59(4): 561-562 (2016) - [r3]Ron Lavi:
Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms 2016: 37-48 - 2015
- [j12]Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. J. Econ. Theory 156: 45-76 (2015) - 2014
- [j11]Ron Lavi, Ella Segev:
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals. Int. J. Game Theory 43(4): 791-819 (2014) - [e1]Ron Lavi:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, SAGT 2014, Haifa, Israel, September 30 - October 2, 2014. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8768, Springer 2014, ISBN 978-3-662-44802-1 [contents] - 2013
- [c22]Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan:
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grant Games. AAAI 2013: 562-568 - [c21]Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply. EC 2013: 415-416 - [i2]Oren Ben-Zwi, Ron Lavi, Ilan Newman:
Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium. CoRR abs/1301.1153 (2013) - 2012
- [j10]Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games Econ. Behav. 74(2): 486-503 (2012) - [j9]Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren:
Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case. Games Econ. Behav. 76(2): 439-456 (2012) - [j8]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37(2): 244-258 (2012) - [c20]Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan:
Composition games for distributed systems: The EU grant games (abstract). INFOCOM Workshops 2012: 170 - [c19]Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. EC 2012: 36 - [c18]Olivier Compte, Ron Lavi, Ella Segev:
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. EC 2012: 369 - [c17]Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi:
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. EC 2012: 586 - 2011
- [j7]Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. J. ACM 58(6): 25:1-25:24 (2011) - [c16]Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren:
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case. AMMA 2011: 55 - [c15]Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan:
Brief Announcement: Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grants Games. DISC 2011: 197-199 - [c14]Ron Lavi, Marina May:
A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Pareto-Optimality in Quasi-Linear Settings with Public Budgets - Working Paper. WINE 2011: 417 - [i1]Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan:
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games. CoRR abs/1105.5255 (2011)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j6]Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 99-124 (2009) - [j5]Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov:
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies. J. ACM 56(1): 4:1-4:32 (2009) - [j4]Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan:
Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem. Soc. Choice Welf. 32(3): 407-423 (2009) - [j3]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exch. 8(1) (2009) - [c13]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC 2009: 169-176 - [r2]Ron Lavi:
Mechanism Design. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009: 5510-5523 - 2008
- [c12]Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS 2008: 260-269 - [r1]Ron Lavi:
Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms 2008 - 2007
- [j2]Ron Lavi:
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 7(1): 25-29 (2007) - [c11]Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. EC 2007: 252-261 - 2006
- [c10]Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov:
Impersonation-Based Mechanisms. AAAI 2006: 592-597 - [c9]Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov:
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies. SODA 2006: 1054-1063 - 2005
- [c8]Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov:
Mechanism Design for Single-Value Domains. AAAI 2005: 241-247 - [c7]Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy:
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. FOCS 2005: 595-604 - [c6]Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. SODA 2005: 1146-1155 - 2004
- [b1]Ron Lavi:
Auction theory in computational settings (תורת המכרזים עבור מערכות ממוחשבות.). Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, 2004 - [j1]Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. Theor. Comput. Sci. 310(1-3): 159-180 (2004) - [c5]Yair Bartal, Francis Y. L. Chin, Marek Chrobak, Stanley P. Y. Fung, Wojciech Jawor, Ron Lavi, Jirí Sgall, Tomás Tichý:
Online Competitive Algorithms for Maximizing Weighted Throughput of Unit Jobs. STACS 2004: 187-198 - 2003
- [c4]Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan:
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. FOCS 2003: 574-583 - 2001
- [c3]Ron Lavi, Amnon Barak:
The Home Model and Competitive Algorithms for Load Balancing in a Computing Cluster. ICDCS 2001: 127-134 - 2000
- [c2]Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. EC 2000: 233-241
1990 – 1999
- 1998
- [c1]Ron Lavi, Amnon Barak:
Improving the PVM Daemon Network Performance by Direct Network Access. PVM/MPI 1998: 44-51
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-10-07 22:07 CEST by the dblp team
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