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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 156
Volume 156, March 2015
- Lawrence E. Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert D. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
Introduction to computer science and economic theory. 1-13 - Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts. 14-44 - Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. 45-76 - Jing Chen, Silvio Micali:
Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs. 77-102 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan:
Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design. 103-143 - Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Pricing lotteries. 144-174 - John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers:
Multilateral matching. 175-206 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games. 207-245 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass:
Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation. 246-268 - Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure. 269-316 - Tim Roughgarden, Florian Schoppmann:
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games. 317-342 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos:
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions. 343-388 - Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, Yoav Shoham, David M. Pennock:
An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms. 389-416 - Mohsen Bayati, Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Yash Kanoria, Andrea Montanari:
Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks. 417-454
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