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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 142
Volume 142, November 2023
- Takaaki Abe
, Satoshi Nakada:
The in-group egalitarian Owen values. 1-16 - Gaëtan Fournier, Amaury Francou:
Location games with references. 17-32 - Dimitrios Xefteris:
Coordinated democracy. 33-45 - Subhasish Dugar, Quazi Shahriar:
Lying for votes. 46-72 - Daehong Min:
Screening for experiments. 73-100
- Mark Whitmeyer:
Submission costs in risk-taking contests. 101-112
- Valeria Burdea, Maria Montero, Martin Sefton:
Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment. 113-149 - Caio Lorecchio, Daniel Monte:
Bad reputation with simple rating systems. 150-178 - Ilwoo Hwang, Stefan Krasa:
Leadership ability and agenda choice. 179-192 - Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi:
Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner. 193-208 - Brishti Guha:
Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort. 209-225 - Akhil Vohra:
Losing money to make money: The benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports. 226-242 - Mihai Manea, Eric Maskin:
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms. 243-265 - Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong:
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. 266-291 - Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Penélope Hernández, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan:
Markovian persuasion with two states. 292-314 - Cuimin Ba, Alice Gindin:
A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence. 315-338 - Rainer Berkemer, Jens Starke, Atsushi Kawamoto:
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior. 339-356 - Niels Boissonnet, Alexis Ghersengorin, Simon Gleyze:
Revealed deliberate preference change. 357-367
- Ritesh Jain, Michele Lombardi, Christoph Müller:
An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation. 368-380
- Jacob Meyer, Lucas Rentschler:
Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections. 381-410 - Lars Ehlers:
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions. 411-422 - Lining Han, Ruben Juarez, Miguel Vargas:
Robust equilibria in tournaments. 423-439
- Saurav Goyal, Aroon Narayanan:
Ex-post implementation with interdependent values. 440-453
- Simin He, Xun Zhu:
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game. 454-479 - Daniel B. Jones, Mirco Tonin, Michael Vlassopoulos, K. Pun Winichakul:
Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay, multitasking, and sorting in mission-oriented jobs. 480-507 - Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Tomohiro Koana:
Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: Approvals can be harder than strict preferences. 508-526 - Pierpaolo Battigalli, Emiliano Catonini, J. Manili:
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games. 527-551 - Klaus Abbink, Lu Dong, Lingbo Huang:
Preventive wars. 552-569 - Aslihan Akdeniz, Matthijs van Veelen:
Evolution and the ultimatum game. 570-612 - Francesc Dilmé:
Communication between unbiased agents. 613-622 - Ilwoo Hwang:
Policy experimentation with repeated elections. 623-644 - Feifei Lu, Fei Shi:
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints. 645-665 - Elena Panova:
Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay. 666-689 - Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud, Marie-Claire Villeval:
Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter? 690-717 - Kfir Eliaz, Alexander Frug:
Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown. 718-729 - Xiangliang Li:
Bargaining: Nash, Consensus, or Compromise? 730-742 - Andrew Mackenzie, Vilmos Komornik:
Fairly taking turns. 743-764 - Sebastiano Della Lena, Elena Manzoni, Fabrizio Panebianco:
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust. 765-793 - Daeyoung Jeong, Semin Kim:
Stable constitutions. 794-811 - Andrew Kloosterman, Shakun Mago:
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study. 812-832 - Ratul Das Chaudhury, C. Matthew Leister, Birendra Rai:
Influencing a polarized and connected legislature. 833-850 - Kangkan Dev Choudhury, Tigran Aydinyan:
Stochastic replicator dynamics: A theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment. 851-865 - Alexander W. Cappelen, Shachar Kariv, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden:
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites. 866-878 - Joseph Siani, Narcisse Tedjeugang, Bertrand Tchantcho:
Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games. 879-895 - Bart Taub:
Signal-jamming in the frequency domain. 896-930 - Loukas Balafoutas, Helena Fornwagner, Brit Grosskopf:
Predictably competitive? What faces can tell us about competitive behavior. 931-940 - Nizar Allouch, Maya Jalloul, Alfred Duncan:
Strategic default in financial networks. 941-954 - Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa, Tetsuo Yamamori:
Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment. 955-977
- Xiang Sun, Jin Xu, Junjie Zhou:
Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks. 978-991
- Sung-Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh, Jingfeng Lu:
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles. 992-1011
- Wonki Jo Cho, William Thomson:
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result. 1012-1017
- Stefanie Y. Schmitt, Dominik Bruckner:
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies. 1018-1042
- Abraham Neyman:
A Course on Stochastic Game Theory, by Eilon Solan, Cambridge University Press, 2022. 1043-1044
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