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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 117
Volume 117, September 2019
- Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau
:
Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem. 1-14 - Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg, Alec Smith:
Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games. 15-39 - Antonio Tesoriere:
Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents. 40-58 - Li Chen, Juan Sebastián Pereyra:
Self-selection in school choice. 59-81 - Axel Bernergård, Erik Mohlin:
Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies. 82-97 - Francesc Dilmé:
Pre-trade private investments. 98-119 - Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino:
Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility. 120-143 - William Minozzi, Jonathan Woon:
The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games. 144-162 - Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ehud Lehrer:
Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games. 163-194 - David R. Munro, Stephen J. Rassenti:
Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance. 195-217 - Syngjoo Choi, José-Alberto Guerra, Jinwoo Kim:
Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment. 218-237
- Dinah Rosenberg, Nicolas Vieille:
Zero-sum games with ambiguity. 238-249
- Charlotte Saucet, Marie-Claire Villeval:
Motivated memory in dictator games. 250-275 - Shota Ichihashi:
Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion. 276-288 - Luca Corazzini, Stefano Galavotti, Paola Valbonesi:
An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities. 289-315
- Mark Voorneveld:
An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept. 316-321
- Christopher P. Chambers, Paul J. Healy, Nicolas S. Lambert:
Proper scoring rules with general preferences: A dual characterization of optimal reports. 322-341 - Andy Brownback, Michael A. Kuhn:
Understanding outcome bias. 342-360 - Shunsuke Hanato:
Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator. 361-379 - Jörg Oechssler, Hannes Rau, Alex Roomets:
Hedging, ambiguity, and the reversal of order axiom. 380-387 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Johannes Buckenmaier:
Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences. 388-401 - Tilman Klumpp, Kai A. Konrad, Adam Solomon:
The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games. 402-419 - Kirby Nielsen, Puja Bhattacharya, John H. Kagel, Arjun Sengupta:
Teams promise but do not deliver. 420-432 - Nicola Maaser, Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub:
Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis. 433-450
- Nicolas Gravel, Michel Poitevin:
Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion. 451-460
- Stefania Sitzia, Jiwei Zheng:
Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points - an experimental investigation. 461-478 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman:
The truth behind the myth of the Folk theorem. 479-498
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