default search action
Search dblp
Full-text search
- > Home
Please enter a search query
- case-insensitive prefix search: default
e.g., sig matches "SIGIR" as well as "signal" - exact word search: append dollar sign ($) to word
e.g., graph$ matches "graph", but not "graphics" - boolean and: separate words by space
e.g., codd model - boolean or: connect words by pipe symbol (|)
e.g., graph|network
Update May 7, 2017: Please note that we had to disable the phrase search operator (.) and the boolean not operator (-) due to technical problems. For the time being, phrase search queries will yield regular prefix search result, and search terms preceded by a minus will be interpreted as regular (positive) search terms.
Author search results
no matches
Venue search results
no matches
Refine list
refine by author
- no options
- temporarily not available
refine by venue
- no options
- temporarily not available
refine by type
- no options
- temporarily not available
refine by access
- no options
- temporarily not available
refine by year
- no options
- temporarily not available
Publication search results
found 33 matches
- 2007
- Ricardo Arlegi:
Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 131-143 (2007) - Andrea Attar, Gwenaël Piaser, Nicolás Porteiro:
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 590-593 (2007) - Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou:
More strategies, more Nash equilibria. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 551-557 (2007) - Paul Beaudry, Franck Portier:
When can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo-classical settings? J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 458-477 (2007) - Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller:
Money, credit and banking. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 171-195 (2007) - Ulrich Berger:
Brown's original fictitious play. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 572-578 (2007) - Subir Bose, Jinhua Zhao:
Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 357-381 (2007) - Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont, Kotaro Suzumura:
Ordering infinite utility streams. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 579-589 (2007) - Yann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton:
Public goods in networks. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 478-494 (2007) - Hongbin Cai, John Riley, Lixin Ye:
Reserve price signaling. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 253-268 (2007) - Braz Camargo:
Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 558-566 (2007) - Geoffroy de Clippel:
The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 144-158 (2007) - Begoña Domínguez:
Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 159-170 (2007) - Federico Echenique:
Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 514-532 (2007) - Susanna Esteban, Eiichi Miyagawa, Matthew Shum:
Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 306-338 (2007) - Francesco Feri:
Stochastic stability in networks with decay. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 442-457 (2007) - Christian Ghiglino, Alain Venditti:
Wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in two-sector economies. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 414-441 (2007) - Jerry R. Green, Nancy L. Stokey:
A two-person game of information transmission. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 90-104 (2007) - Matthew Haag, Roger Lagunoff:
On the size and structure of group cooperation. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 68-89 (2007) - Ohad Kadan:
Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 495-513 (2007) - Fahad Khalil, David Martimort, Bruno Parigi:
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 35-67 (2007) - Jaehoon Kim, Mark Fey:
The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 236-252 (2007) - Jihong Lee, Hamid Sabourian:
Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 214-235 (2007) - Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein:
Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 339-356 (2007) - Michael Mandler:
Strategies as states. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 105-130 (2007) - Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken:
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 533-544 (2007) - Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe:
The structure of strategy-proof social choice - Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 269-305 (2007) - Jawwad Noor:
Commitment and self-control. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 1-34 (2007) - Michael Peters:
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 594-595 (2007) - José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto:
Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities. J. Econ. Theory 135(1): 545-550 (2007)
skipping 3 more matches
loading more results
failed to load more results, please try again later
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
Unpaywalled article links
Add open access links from to the list of external document links (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of unpaywall.org to load hyperlinks to open access articles. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Unpaywall privacy policy.
Archived links via Wayback Machine
For web page which are no longer available, try to retrieve content from the of the Internet Archive (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of archive.org to check for archived content of web pages that are no longer available. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Internet Archive privacy policy.
Reference lists
Add a list of references from , , and to record detail pages.
load references from crossref.org and opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the APIs of crossref.org, opencitations.net, and semanticscholar.org to load article reference information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Crossref privacy policy and the OpenCitations privacy policy, as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
Citation data
Add a list of citing articles from and to record detail pages.
load citations from opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of opencitations.net and semanticscholar.org to load citation information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the OpenCitations privacy policy as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
OpenAlex data
Load additional information about publications from .
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of openalex.org to load additional information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the information given by OpenAlex.
retrieved on 2024-11-29 22:26 CET from data curated by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint