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Publication search results
found 32 matches
- 2010
- Daron Acemoglu, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Ali ParandehGheibi:
Spread of (mis)information in social networks. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 194-227 (2010) - Regina M. Anctil, John Dickhaut, Cathleen Johnson, Chandra Kanodia:
Does information transparency decrease coordination failure? Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 228-241 (2010) - Vincent Anesi
:
Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 488-493 (2010) - Masaki Aoyagi
:
Information feedback in a dynamic tournament. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 242-260 (2010) - Salvador Barberà
, Danilo Coelho
:
On the rule of k names. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 44-61 (2010) - Jean-Pierre Benoît, Lewis A. Kornhauser:
Only a dictatorship is efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 261-270 (2010) - Christian Borgs
, Jennifer T. Chayes
, Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
The myth of the Folk Theorem. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 34-43 (2010) - Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer:
Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 271-288 (2010) - Roberto Cominetti
, Emerson Melo, Sylvain Sorin:
A payoff-based learning procedure and its application to traffic games. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 71-83 (2010) - Geert Dhaene, Jan Bouckaert:
Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 289-303 (2010) - Kfir Eliaz, Andrew Schotter:
Paying for confidence: An experimental study of the demand for non-instrumental information. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 304-324 (2010) - Yuk-fai Fong, Daniel F. Garrett:
Bidding in a possibly common-value auction. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 494-501 (2010) - John Geanakoplos, Pradeep Dubey:
Credit cards and inflation. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 325-353 (2010) - Jacob K. Goeree
, Charles A. Holt:
Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 146-169 (2010) - Thorsten Hens
, Bodo Vogt:
Indirect reciprocity and money. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 354-374 (2010) - Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Aniol Llorente-Saguer
:
A simple mechanism for resolving conflict. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 375-391 (2010) - Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Peter Østerdal
:
Monotonicity of social welfare optima. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 392-402 (2010) - Jürgen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder:
Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: Theory and experimental evidence. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 403-424 (2010) - Patrick Hummel:
On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 425-445 (2010) - Yan-An Hwang:
Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 502-508 (2010) - Matthew O. Jackson
, Ehud Lehrer:
Introduction to the special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 1-3 (2010) - Matthew O. Jackson
, Alison Watts:
Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 170-191 (2010) - Kamal Jain, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Eisenberg-Gale markets: Algorithms and game-theoretic properties. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 84-106 (2010) - Andrew McLennan, Rabee Tourky:
Imitation games and computation. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 4-11 (2010) - Paul Milgrom
:
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 62-70 (2010) - Hervé Moulin:
An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 107-131 (2010) - Frank H. Page Jr., Myrna Holtz Wooders:
Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 12-20 (2010) - William H. Sandholm:
Decompositions and potentials for normal form games. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 446-456 (2010) - Yair Tauman, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
:
Bargaining with a property rights owner. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 132-145 (2010) - Curtis R. Taylor, Hüseyin Yildirim:
A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs. Games Econ. Behav. 70(2): 457-471 (2010)
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