• case-insensitive prefix search: default
  e.g., sig matches "SIGIR" as well as "signal"
• exact word search: append dollar sign ($) to word
  e.g., graph$ matches "graph", but not "graphics"
• boolean and: separate words by space
  e.g., codd model
• boolean or: connect words by pipe symbol (|)
  e.g., graph|network

Update May 7, 2017: Please note that we had to disable the phrase search operator (.) and the boolean not operator (-) due to technical problems. For the time being, phrase search queries will yield regular prefix search result, and search terms preceded by a minus will be interpreted as regular (positive) search terms.

found 20 matches

• 2004
• 
  Nabil I. Al-Najjar:
  Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 1-35 (2004)
• 
  Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker:
  Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 36-71 (2004)
• 
  Andreas Blume, Tone Arnold:
  Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46(2004) 240-259]. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 453 (2004)
• 
  Giacomo Bonanno:
  Memory and perfect recall in extensive games. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 237-256 (2004)
• 
  Bogaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv:
  Observational learning under imperfect information. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 72-86 (2004)
• 
  Youngsub Chun:
  On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 257-267 (2004)
• 
  Eric van Damme, Sjaak Hurkens:
  Endogenous price leadership. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 404-420 (2004)
• 
  Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger:
  A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 268-298 (2004)
• 
  Péter Eso, James Schummer:
  Bribing and signaling in second price auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 299-324 (2004)
• 
  Eric J. Friedman, Mikhael Shor, Scott Shenker, Barry Sopher:
  An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 325-352 (2004)
• 
  Ron Holzman, Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 104-123 (2004)
• 
  Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer:
  Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 87-103 (2004)
• 
  Igal Milchtaich:
  Random-player games. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 353-388 (2004)
• 
  Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
  Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 124-156 (2004)
• 
  Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos:
  Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 389-403 (2004)
• 
  Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky:
  Belief-based equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 157-171 (2004)
• 
  Eilon Solan, Leeat Yariv:
  Games with espionage. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 172-199 (2004)
• 
  Ran Spiegler:
  Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 200-220 (2004)
• 
  William Stanford:
  Individually rational pure strategies in large games. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 221-233 (2004)
• 
  Andreas Westermark:
  Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2): 421-452 (2004)