- 1997
- Harry Aarts, Kees Hoede, Yukihiko Funaki:
A marginalistic value for monotonic set games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(1): 97-111 (1997) - Javier Arin, Vincent Feltkamp:
The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(1): 61-73 (1997) - Elaine Bennett, Michael Maschler, William R. Zame:
A demand adjustment process. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 423-438 (1997) - Parkash Chander, Henry Tulkens:
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 379-401 (1997) - Stephen Ching:
Strategy-proofness and "median voters". Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 473-490 (1997) - Ross Cressman:
Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 525-547 (1997) - Mark B. Cronshaw, Levon S. Kazarian:
Some bounds for Markov chains. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 579-582 (1997) - Paolo Cubiotti:
Existence of nash equilibria for generalized games without upper semicontinuity. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 267-273 (1997) - Jean Derks
, Jeroen Kuipers:
On the core of routing games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 193-205 (1997) - Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Sándor P. Fekete, Winfried Hochstättler:
On the complexity of testing membership in the core of min-cost spanning tree games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 361-366 (1997) - Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover:
Ternary voting games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 335-351 (1997) - János Flesch, Frank Thuijsman, Koos Vrieze:
Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 303-314 (1997) - Bert Fristedt:
The deceptive number changing game, in the absence of symmetry. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 183-191 (1997) - Andrey Garnaev, G. Garnaeva, P. Goutal:
On the infiltration game. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 215-221 (1997) - Daniel Granot, Frieda Granot, Weiping R. Zhu:
The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 207-214 (1997) - Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler:
The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(1): 75-95 (1997) - John Hillas, Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen:
On the finiteness of stable sets. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 275-278 (1997) - Ulrich Kamecke:
Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 409-417 (1997) - Jeroen Kuipers:
Minimum cost forest games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 367-377 (1997) - Massimo Marinacci:
Finitely additive and epsilon Nash equilibria. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 315-333 (1997) - Abraham Neyman:
Correlated equilibrium and potential games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(2): 223-227 (1997) - Andrzej S. Nowak:
On an axiomatization of the banzhaf value without the additivity axiom. Int. J. Game Theory 26(1): 137-141 (1997) - Amit Pazgal:
Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 439-453 (1997) - Clara Ponsati, Joel Watson:
Multiple-issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 501-524 (1997) - Thomas Quint, Martin Shubik:
A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 353-359 (1997) - Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs:
On the Cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 491-499 (1997) - Amnon Rapoport:
Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form. Int. J. Game Theory 26(1): 113-136 (1997) - John M. Rulnick, Lloyd S. Shapley:
Convex covers of symmetric games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 561-577 (1997) - Maria Saez-Marti:
On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games. Int. J. Game Theory 26(4): 549-559 (1997) - Ken-Ichi Shimomura:
Quasi-Cores in Bargaining sets. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3): 283-302 (1997)
