"Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object ..."

Aditya Vikram (2024)

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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-023-01479-X

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type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-02-04

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Aditya Vikram:
Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values. Soc. Choice Welf. 62(1): 89-108 (2024)

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