"A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research."

Daniel F. Stone (2011)

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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0496-Z

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type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-10-06

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Daniel F. Stone:
A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research. Soc. Choice Welf. 37(3): 397-424 (2011)

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