"A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules."

Mark Fey (2003)

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DOI: 10.1007/S003550200157

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-10-26

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Mark Fey:
A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules. Soc. Choice Welf. 20(1): 27-32 (2003)

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