"Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market."

Aditya Vikram (2025)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.11.003

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2025-02-04

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Aditya Vikram:
Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market. Math. Soc. Sci. 133: 1-12 (2025)

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