"Bank Monitoring Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection."

Nicolás Hernández-Santibánez, Dylan Possamaï, Chao Zhou (2020)

> Home

Details and statistics

DOI: 10.1007/S10957-019-01621-9

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-10-06

- view
  - electronic edition via DOI
  - unpaywalled version
  authority control:
- export record
  dblp key:
  - journals/jota/Hernandez-Santibanez20
- ask others
- share record
  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/jota/Hernandez-Santibanez20
Nicolás Hernández-Santibánez, Dylan Possamaï, Chao Zhou:
Bank Monitoring Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 184(3): 988-1035 (2020)

manage site settings

To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.