"Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and ..."

Andrea Prat (2002)

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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2793

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-24

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Andrea Prat:
Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies. J. Econ. Theory 103(1): 162-189 (2002)

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