"Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games ..."

Daniel Friedman, Daniel N. Ostrov (2013)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2012.07.004

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-24

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Daniel Friedman, Daniel N. Ostrov:
Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games. J. Econ. Theory 148(2): 743-777 (2013)

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