"When One Decides for Many: The Effect of Delegation Methods on Cooperation ..."

Ramzi Suleiman, Ilan Fischer (2000)

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DOI: —

access: open

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-07-09

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Ramzi Suleiman, Ilan Fischer:
When One Decides for Many: The Effect of Delegation Methods on Cooperation in Simulated Inter-group Conflicts. J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul. 3(4) (2000)

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