"Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped."

Vikram Manjunath (2014)

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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-013-0396-4

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2017-05-20

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Vikram Manjunath:
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped. Int. J. Game Theory 43(3): 579-597 (2014)

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