"Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set ..."

Wolfgang R. Köhler (2006)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001028

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2017-05-26

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Wolfgang R. Köhler:
Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex. IGTR 8(3): 469-482 (2006)

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