"Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR ..."

Nils Wisiol et al. (2017)

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type: Informal or Other Publication

metadata version: 2020-05-11

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Nils Wisiol, Christoph Graebnitz, Marian Margraf, Manuel Oswald, Tudor A. A. Soroceanu, Benjamin Zengin:
Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2017: 932 (2017)

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