"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring."

Tristan Tomala (2009)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.02.005

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-22

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Tristan Tomala:
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 67(2): 682-694 (2009)

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