"Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring."

Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala (2004)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.12.005

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-22

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Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 49(2): 313-344 (2004)

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