"Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient."

Michal Feldman et al. (2020)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.11.009

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2023-10-30

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Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 123: 327-341 (2020)

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