"Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions."

Justin Burkett, Kyle Woodward (2020)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.011

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-06-15

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Justin Burkett, Kyle Woodward:
Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 121: 297-306 (2020)

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