"Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution."

Salvador Barberà, Michael Maschler, Jonathan Shalev (2001)

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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.2000.0827

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-22

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Salvador Barberà, Michael Maschler, Jonathan Shalev:
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution. Games Econ. Behav. 37(1): 40-78 (2001)

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