"Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining."

Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi (2003)

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DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00029-0

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-22

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Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi:
Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 44(2): 195-216 (2003)

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