"Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: ..."

Josef Schosser (2019)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.03.044

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-21

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Josef Schosser:
Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: Computing incentives under risk. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 277(3): 1113-1123 (2019)

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