"Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance."

R. Preston McAfee et al. (2024)

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DOI: 10.48550/ARXIV.2403.04856

access: open

type: Informal or Other Publication

metadata version: 2024-04-03

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  - journals/corr/abs-2403-04856
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  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/corr/abs-2403-04856
R. Preston McAfee, Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance. CoRR abs/2403.04856 (2024)

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