"Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents."

Nikhil R. Devanur et al. (2020)

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DOI: 10.1145/3391403.3399454

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2024-08-04

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Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. EC 2020: 193-256

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