"LAMA: Leakage Abuse Attacks Against Microsoft Always Encrypted."

Ryan Seah et al. (2024)

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DOI: 10.5220/0012714800003767

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2024-09-19

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  dblp key:
  - conf/secrypt/SeahKHN24
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  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/conf/secrypt/SeahKHN24
Ryan Seah, Daren Khu, Alexander Hoover, Ruth Ng:
LAMA: Leakage Abuse Attacks Against Microsoft Always Encrypted. SECRYPT 2024: 628-633

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