"An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for ..."

Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline (2018)

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DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2018.00046

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2024-10-06

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Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline:
An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). FOCS 2018: 404-415

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