"Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular ..."

Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla (2019)

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DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2019.00024

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2024-08-04

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Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla:
Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. FOCS 2019: 233-248

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