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ORCIDNicholas C. Yannelis
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2020 – today
- 2023
[j15]Pavlo Prokopovych
, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest. Games Econ. Behav. 140: 348-362 (2023)- 2022
- [j14]Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Robust coalitional implementation. Games Econ. Behav. 132: 553-575 (2022)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j13]Pavlo Prokopovych, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information. J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019) - 2018
- [j12]Luciano Irineu de Castro, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility. J. Econ. Theory 177: 678-707 (2018) - 2017
- [j11]Luciano Irineu de Castro, Zhiwei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Implementation under ambiguity. Games Econ. Behav. 101: 20-33 (2017) - [j10]Xiang Sun, Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Equilibria and incentives in private information economies. J. Econ. Theory 169: 474-488 (2017) - 2016
- [j9]Wei He, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games. J. Econ. Theory 162: 181-194 (2016) - 2015
- [j8]Wei He, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem. Games Econ. Behav. 91: 26-35 (2015) - 2012
- [j7]Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 329-339 (2012)
2000 – 2009
- 2008
- [j6]Konrad Podczeck, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities. J. Econ. Theory 141(1): 152-183 (2008) - 2007
- [j5]Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies. Games Econ. Behav. 61(1): 131-155 (2007) - [j4]Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives. J. Econ. Theory 134(1): 175-194 (2007) - 2001
- [j3]Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Rabee Tourky, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
A Theory of Value with Non-linear Prices: Equilibrium Analysis beyond Vector Lattices. J. Econ. Theory 100(1): 22-72 (2001) - [j2]Rabee Tourky, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Markets with Many More Agents than Commodities: Aumann's "Hidden" Assumption. J. Econ. Theory 101(1): 189-221 (2001) - 2000
- [j1]Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Rabee Tourky, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Cone Conditions in General Equilibrium Theory. J. Econ. Theory 92(1): 96-121 (2000)
Coauthor Index
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