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Françoise Forges
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2020 – today
- 2022
- [j18]Stéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges:
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case. Games Econ. Behav. 134: 242-263 (2022) - [j17]Françoise Forges, József Sákovics:
Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm. Int. J. Game Theory 51(3): 589-605 (2022) - 2021
- [j16]Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault:
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval. Int. J. Game Theory 50(2): 475-502 (2021) - 2020
- [i1]Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault:
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval. CoRR abs/2001.07413 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2017
- [j15]Ehud Kalai, Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Françoise Forges, David C. Parkes, Jennifer Byrd:
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. Games Econ. Behav. 103: 1-18 (2017) - 2016
- [j14]Françoise Forges, Ulrich Horst, Antoine Salomon:
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games. Int. J. Game Theory 45(1-2): 11-36 (2016) - 2015
- [j13]Antoine Salomon, Françoise Forges:
Bayesian repeated games and reputation. J. Econ. Theory 159: 70-104 (2015) - 2014
- [j12]Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli:
Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406]. J. Econ. Theory 151: 605-606 (2014) - 2013
- [j11]Françoise Forges:
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment. Games Econ. Behav. 78: 64-71 (2013) - [j10]Françoise Forges, Roberto Serrano:
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: some Open Problems. IGTR 15(2) (2013) - 2011
- [j9]Omer Biran, Françoise Forges:
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values. Games Econ. Behav. 73(1): 52-64 (2011)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j8]Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli:
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets. J. Econ. Theory 144(1): 135-145 (2009) - [r1]Françoise Forges:
Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games. Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009: 1587-1596 - 2008
- [j7]Frédéric Koessler, Françoise Forges:
Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types. IGTR 10(2): 145-164 (2008) - [j6]Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler:
Long persuasion games. J. Econ. Theory 143(1): 1-35 (2008) - [j5]Bernhard von Stengel, Françoise Forges:
Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity. Math. Oper. Res. 33(4): 1002-1022 (2008) - 2006
- [j4]Françoise Forges:
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments. Soc. Choice Welf. 26(2): 403-419 (2006) - 2004
- [j3]Françoise Forges:
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game. Math. Soc. Sci. 47(2): 135-151 (2004) - 2001
- [j2]Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli:
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core. J. Econ. Theory 98(1): 179-188 (2001)
1990 – 1999
- 1994
- [c1]Françoise Forges:
Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission. Essays in Game Theory 1994: 65-95
1980 – 1989
- 1988
- [j1]Françoise Forges:
Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. Math. Oper. Res. 13(2): 191-231 (1988)
Coauthor Index
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