Synthese, Volume 195

Volume 195, Number 1, January 2018

Special Issue on Mechanistic and Topological Explanations

• 
  Daniel Kostic:
  Mechanistic and topological explanations: an introduction. 1-10
• 
  Alex Rosenberg:
  Making mechanism interesting. 11-33
• 
  Totte Harinen:
  Mutual manipulability and causal inbetweenness. 35-54
• 
  Charles Rathkopf:
  Network representation and complex systems. 55-78
• 
  Daniel Kostic:
  The topological realization. 79-98
• 
  Laura Felline:
  Mechanisms meet structural explanation. 99-114
• 
  Philippe Huneman:
  Diversifying the picture of explanations in biological sciences: ways of combining topology with mechanisms. 115-146
• 
  Marie Darrason:
  Mechanistic and topological explanations in medicine: the case of medical genetics and network medicine. 147-173

Regular Articles

• 
  Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Elisabeth A. Lloyd:
  The 'Alice in Wonderland' mechanics of the rejection of (climate) science: simulating coherence by conspiracism. 175-196
• 
  Rachel Goodman:
  On the supposed connection between proper names and singular thought. 197-223
• 
  Colin Howson:
  Repelling a Prussian charge with a solution to a paradox of Dubins. 225-233
• 
  Samuel Murray:
  Reference fiction, and omission. 235-257
• 
  Adam Bales:
  Richness and rationality: causal decision theory and the WAR argument. 259-267
• 
  Seyed N. Mousavian, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour:
  Concept originalism, reference-shift and belief reports. 269-285
• 
  Thomas Lockhart:
  Why warrant transmits across epistemological disjunctivist Moorean-style arguments. 287-319
• 
  Ivano Ciardelli:
  Questions as information types. 321-365
• 
  Mathieu Beirlaen, Bert Leuridan, Frederik Van De Putte:
  A logic for the discovery of deterministic causal regularities. 367-399
• 
  Efraim Wallach:
  Bayesian representation of a prolonged archaeological debate. 401-431
• 
  Richmond H. Thomason:
  The Little Nell Problem: reasonable and resolute maintenance of agent intentions. 433-440
• 
  Can Baskent:
  A Yabloesque paradox in epistemic game theory. 441-464
• 
  Luciano Floridi:
  What a maker's knowledge could be. 465-481

Volume 195, Number 2, February 2018

Special Issue on Games, Interactive Rationality, and Learning: The Evolution of Inference

• 
  Justine Jacot, Philip Pärnamets:
  GIRL special issue introduction. 483-490
• 
  Iris van Rooij, Cory D. Wright, Johan Kwisthout, Todd Wareham:
  Rational analysis, intractability, and the prospects of 'as if'-explanations. 491-510
• 
  Daniel Cownden, Kimmo Eriksson, Pontus Strimling:
  The implications of learning across perceptually and strategically distinct situations. 511-528
• 
  Patricia Rich:
  Comparing the axiomatic and ecological approaches to rationality: fundamental agreement theorems in SCOP. 529-547
• 
  Peter Gärdenfors:
  Levels of communication and lexical semantics. 549-569
• 
  Maria Spychalska:
  At least not false, at most possible: between truth and assertibility of superlative quantifiers. 571-602
• 
  Justin Bruner, Cailin O'Connor, Hannah Rubin, Simon M. Huttegger:
  David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning. 603-621
• 
  Jeffrey A. Barrett:
  The evolution, appropriation, and composition of rules. 623-636

Regular Articles

• 
  Lu Teng:
  Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification? 637-656
• 
  Andrew Brenner:
  Science and the special composition question. 657-678
• 
  Cristina Borgoni:
  Basic self-knowledge and transparency. 679-696
• 
  Miles MacLeod:
  What makes interdisciplinarity difficult? Some consequences of domain specificity in interdisciplinary practice. 697-720
• 
  Alexander Sandgren:
  Which witch is which? Exotic objects and intentional identity. 721-739
• 
  David S. Watson, Luciano Floridi:
  Crowdsourced science: sociotechnical epistemology in the e-research paradigm. 741-764
• 
  Roger Sansom, Jannai Shields:
  Asymmetry in the unificationist theory of causal explanation. 765-783
• 
  Stephan Krämer:
  Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content. 785-814
• 
  Guy Longworth:
  Understanding what was said. 815-834
• 
  Sander Beckers, Joost Vennekens:
  A principled approach to defining actual causation. 835-862
• 
  Manuel Gustavo Isaac:
  Toward a phenomenological epistemology of mathematical logic. 863-874
• 
  Raphaël Sandoz:
  Applying mathematics to empirical sciences: flashback to a puzzling disciplinary interaction. 875-898
• 
  James Chase, Penelope Rush:
  Factivity, consistency and knowability. 899-918
• 
  Hasen Khudairi:
  Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem. 919-926

Volume 195, Number 3, March 2018

Special Issue on Minimalism about Truth

• 
  Joseph Ulatowski, Cory D. Wright:
  Minimalism about truth: special issue introduction. 927-933
• 
  Andrew W. Howat:
  Constituting assertion: a pragmatist critique of Horwich's 'Truth'. 935-954
• 
  Katarzyna Kijania-Placek:
  Can minimalism about truth embrace polysemy? 955-985
• 
  Cory D. Wright:
  Truth, explanation, minimalism. 987-1009
• 
  Keith Simmons:
  Three questions for minimalism. 1011-1034
• 
  Teresa Marques:
  This is not an instance of (E). 1035-1063
• 
  Anil Gupta, Shawn Standefer:
  Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth. 1065-1075
• 
  Cezary Cieslinski:
  Minimalism and the generalisation problem: on Horwich's second solution. 1077-1101
• 
  Filippo Ferrari:
  The value of minimalist truth. 1103-1125
• 
  Paul Horwich:
  Is truth a normative concept? 1127-1138

Regular Articles

• 
  Douglas Ian Campbell:
  Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism. 1139-1161
• 
  Nicholas Tebben:
  Belief isn't voluntary, but commitment is. 1163-1179
• 
  Nicholas DiBella:
  The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability. 1181-1210
• 
  Neil McDonnell:
  Transitivity and proportionality in causation. 1211-1229
• 
  Francesca Poggiolesi:
  On constructing a logic for the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding. 1231-1254
• 
  Anna Leuschner:
  Is it appropriate to 'target' inappropriate dissent? on the normative consequences of climate skepticism. 1255-1271
• 
  Stephan Hartmann, Soroush Rafiee Rad:
  Voting, deliberation and truth. 1273-1293
• 
  Dionysis Christias:
  On the proper construal of the manifest-scientific image distinction: Brandom contra Sellars. 1295-1320
• 
  Anthony Bolos, James Henry Collin:
  A sensitive virtue epistemology. 1321-1335
• 
  Marc Lange:
  Transitivity, self-explanation, and the explanatory circularity argument against Humean accounts of natural law. 1337-1353
• 
  Jonathan Wright:
  Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence. 1355-1373

Volume 195, Number 4, April 2018

Special Issue on Causation in the Metaphysics of Science: Natural Kinds.

• 
  Andrew McFarland:
  Introduction for synthese special issue causation in the metaphysics of science: natural kinds. 1375-1378
• 
  Muhammad Ali Khalidi:
  Natural kinds as nodes in causal networks. 1379-1396
• 
  Alexander Bird:
  The metaphysics of natural kinds. 1397-1426
• 
  P. D. Magnus:
  Taxonomy, ontology, and natural kinds. 1427-1439
• 
  Andrew McFarland:
  Causal powers and isomeric chemical kinds. 1441-1457
• 
  Françoise Longy:
  Do we need two notions of natural kind to account for the history of "jade"? 1459-1486
• 
  Matthew H. Slater:
  Anchoring in ecosystemic kinds. 1487-1508

Regular Articles

• 
  Mirja Hartimo:
  Husserl on completeness, definitely. 1509-1527
• 
  Andrea Strollo:
  A simple notion of validity for alethic pluralism. 1529-1546
• 
  Andrew Peet:
  Etiology, understanding, and testimonial belief. 1547-1567
• 
  Jean-Michel Delhôtel:
  Relativistic frameworks and the case for (or against) incommensurability. 1569-1585
• 
  Pascale Willemsen:
  Omissions and expectations: a new approach to the things we failed to do. 1587-1614
• 
  Kevin Wallbridge:
  The peculiar case of Lehrer's lawyer. 1615-1630
• 
  William Roche:
  Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect? 1631-1648
• 
  Rafal Urbaniak, Bert Leuridan:
  Challenging Lewis's challenge to the best system account of lawhood. 1649-1666
• 
  Lukas Lewerentz, Benjamin Marschall:
  Metasemantics, intentions and circularity. 1667-1679
• 
  Patrick Girard, Marcus Anthony Triplett:
  Prioritised ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning. 1681-1703
• 
  Todd Ganson:
  Sensory malfunctions, limitations, and trade-offs. 1705-1713
• 
  David M. Godden, Frank Zenker:
  A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency. 1715-1740
• 
  Yuval Dolev:
  Is ontology the key to understanding tense? 1741-1749
• 
  Sara Green, Maria Serban, Raphael Scholl, Nicholaos Jones, Ingo Brigandt, William Bechtel:
  Network analyses in systems biology: new strategies for dealing with biological complexity. 1751-1777
• 
  Ben White:
  Metaphysical necessity dualism. 1779-1798
• 
  Robert Trueman:
  The Prenective View of propositional content. 1799-1825
• 
  Andrew Moon:
  The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence. 1827-1848

Volume 195, Number 5, May 2018

Neuroscience and its Philosophy

• 
  Valtteri Arstila:
  What makes unique hues unique? 1849-1872
• 
  Geoffrey S. Holtzman:
  A neuropsychological challenge to the sentimentalism/rationalism distinction. 1873-1889
• 
  Mario Villalobos, Joe Dewhurst:
  Enactive autonomy in computational systems. 1891-1908
• 
  Michael Rescorla:
  An interventionist approach to psychological explanation. 1909-1940
• 
  Daniel Williams, Lincoln Colling:
  From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution. 1941-1967
• 
  Denis Buehler:
  The central executive system. 1969-1991

Regular Articles

• 
  Fredrik Haraldsen:
  Rigidity and triviality. 1993-1999
• 
  Chris Ovenden:
  Guidance control and the anti-akrasia chip. 2001-2019
• 
  Yair Levy:
  Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake? 2021-2038
• 
  Hiroshi Ohtani:
  Philosophical pictures about mathematics: Wittgenstein and contradiction. 2039-2063
• 
  Emmanuel J. Genot:
  Strategies of inquiry - The 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' revisited. 2065-2088
• 
  Markus E. Schlosser:
  Embodied cognition and temporally extended agency. 2089-2112
• 
  Franz Knappik:
  Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference. 2113-2140
• 
  Scott Normand:
  Criteria of identity and the hermeneutic goal of ante rem structuralism. 2141-2153
• 
  Derek Lam:
  Is imagination too liberal for modal epistemology? 2155-2174
• 
  Francesco Pupa:
  The argument from convention revisited. 2175-2204
• 
  Lindsay Rettler:
  In defense of doxastic blame. 2205-2226
• 
  Liam Kofi Bright:
  Du Bois' democratic defence of the value free ideal. 2227-2245
• 
  Darren J. Bradley:
  Carnap's epistemological critique of metaphysics. 2247-2265
• 
  Vincenzo Politi:
  Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences. 2267-2293
• 
  Daniel Malinsky:
  Intervening on structure. 2295-2312
• 
  Erhan Demircioglu:
  Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification. 2313-2334
• 
  A. R. J. Fisher:
  On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics. 2335-2353

Volume 195, Number 6, June 2018

Special Issue on Predictive Brains and Embodied, Enactive Cognition

• 
  Michael D. Kirchhoff:
  Predictive brains and embodied, enactive cognition: an introduction to the special issue. 2355-2366
• 
  Nico Orlandi:
  Predictive perceptual systems. 2367-2386
• 
  Alex Kiefer, Jakob Hohwy:
  Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative models. 2387-2415
• 
  Jelle P. Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein, Erik Rietveld:
  The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective. 2417-2444
• 
  Daniel D. Hutto:
  Getting into predictive processing's great guessing game: Bootstrap heaven or hell? 2445-2458
• 
  Micah Allen, Karl J. Friston:
  From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind. 2459-2482
• 
  Regina E. Fabry:
  Betwixt and between: the enculturated predictive processing approach to cognition. 2483-2518
• 
  Michael D. Kirchhoff:
  Autopoiesis, free energy, and the life-mind continuity thesis. 2519-2540
• 
  Colin Klein:
  What do predictive coders want? 2541-2557
• 
  Mark Miller, Andy Clark:
  Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind. 2559-2575
• 
  Jennifer M. Windt:
  Predictive brains, dreaming selves, sleeping bodies: how the analysis of dream movement can inform a theory of self- and world-simulation in dreams. 2577-2625
• 
  Shaun Gallagher, Micah Allen:
  Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition. 2627-2648

Regular Articles

• 
  Sébastien Richard:
  Leśniewski on metalogic and definitions. 2649-2676
• 
  Mark Textor:
  Frege's recognition criterion for thoughts and its problems. 2677-2696
• 
  Francesco Berto, Tom Schoonen:
  Conceivability and possibility: some dilemmas for Humeans. 2697-2715
• 
  Daniel Listwa:
  The Faulty Signal Problem: counterfactual asymmetries in causal decision theory and rational deliberation. 2717-2739
• 
  Gregory Bochner:
  Singular truth-conditions without singular propositions. 2741-2760
• 
  Michael N. Keas:
  Systematizing the theoretical virtues. 2761-2793
• 
  Collin Rice:
  Idealized models, holistic distortions, and universality. 2795-2819
• 
  Alexander Dinges:
  Knowledge, intuition and implicature. 2821-2843

Volume 195, Number 7, July 2018

Special Issue on Defeaters in Current Epistemology

• 
  Luca Moretti, Tommaso Piazza:
  Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue. 2845-2854
• 
  Carla Bagnoli:
  Defeaters and practical knowledge. 2855-2875
• 
  J. Adam Carter:
  Meta-epistemic defeat. 2877-2896
• 
  Albert Casullo:
  Pollock and Sturgeon on defeaters. 2897-2906
• 
  Matthias Steup:
  Destructive defeat and justificational force: the dialectic of dogmatism, conservatism, and meta-evidentialism. 2907-2933
• 
  Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen:
  Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism. 2935-2966
• 
  Berit Brogaard:
  In defense of hearing meanings. 2967-2983
• 
  Kathrin Glüer:
  Defeating looks. 2985-3012
• 
  Peter J. Graham:
  Formulating reductionism about testimonial warrant and the challenge from childhood testimony. 3013-3033
• 
  Kevin McCain:
  Explanationist aid for phenomenal conservatism. 3035-3050
• 
  Matthew McGrath:
  Defeating pragmatic encroachment? 3051-3064
• 
  Duncan Pritchard:
  Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat. 3065-3077

Regular Articles

• 
  Blake McAllister:
  Seemings as sui generis. 3079-3096
• 
  Andrew Cooper:
  Two directions for teleology: naturalism and idealism. 3097-3119
• 
  Finnur Dellsén:
  Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance. 3121-3141
• 
  Brett Topey:
  Quinean holism, analyticity, and diachronic rational norms. 3143-3171
• 
  Alexandru Radulescu:
  The difference between indexicals and demonstratives. 3173-3196
• 
  Jonathan Fuller:
  What are chronic diseases? 3197-3220
• 
  Brian Kogelmann:
  What we choose, what we prefer. 3221-3240
• 
  Vladimír Svoboda:
  A Lewisian taxonomy for deontic logic. 3241-3266
• 
  Pendaran Roberts, James Andow, Kelly Ann Schmidtke:
  Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. 3267-3287

Volume 195, Number 8, August 2018

Special Issue on Trends in Philosophy of Language and Mind

• 
  Hanoch Ben-Yami, Robyn Carston, Markus Werning:
  Introduction to the 2nd Synthese Special Issue: trends in philosophy of language and mind. 3289-3291
• 
  María Alvarez:
  Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality. 3293-3310
• 
  Manuel García-Carpintero:
  De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification. 3311-3333
• 
  Teresa Marques:
  Retractions. 3335-3359
• 
  Martine Nida-Rümelin:
  The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm. 3361-3387
• 
  Josefa Toribio:
  Visual experience: rich but impenetrable. 3389-3406

Regular Articles

• 
  Toni Kannisto:
  Kant and Frege on existence. 3407-3432
• 
  Michael Poznic:
  Thin versus thick accounts of scientific representation. 3433-3451
• 
  Ema Sullivan-Bissett:
  Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function? 3453-3476
• 
  Dimitri Coelho Mollo:
  Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation: the proper way of seeing the mechanistic view of concrete computation. 3477-3497
• 
  Poong Shil Lee:
  Mental files, concepts, and bodies of information. 3499-3518
• 
  John Collins:
  The redundancy of the act. 3519-3545
• 
  Mikio Akagi:
  Rethinking the problem of cognition. 3547-3570
• 
  Matthew Kopec:
  A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality. 3571-3596
• 
  Joshua Habgood-Coote:
  Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms. 3597-3620
• 
  Minghui Ma, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen:
  Gamma graph calculi for modal logics. 3621-3650
• 
  Xuefeng Wen:
  Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic. 3651-3683
• 
  Arthur Schipper:
  Aboutness and negative truths: a modest strategy for truthmaker theorists. 3685-3722
• 
  Michael J. Clark, Nathan W. Wildman:
  Grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination. 3723-3733

Volume 195, Number 9, September 2018

Special Issue on Epistemic Justification

• 
  Benjamin Bewersdorf, Jeanne Peijnenburg:
  Introduction to the special issue on epistemic justification. 3735
• 
  Eleonora Cresto:
  Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account. 3737-3753
• 
  Julien Dutant, Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn:
  Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do. 3755-3772
• 
  Anthony Robert Booth:
  Advice for Infallibilists: DIVORCE and RETREAT! 3773-3789
• 
  Nathaniel Sharadin:
  Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence. 3791-3809
• 
  Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard:
  Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification. 3811-3820
• 
  Job de Grefte:
  Epistemic justification and epistemic luck. 3821-3836
• 
  Wolfgang Spohn:
  Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways. 3837-3856
• 
  Martin Smith:
  The logic of epistemic justification. 3857-3875
• 
  Gerhard Schurz:
  Optimality justifications: new foundations for foundation-oriented epistemology. 3877-3897
• 
  William Roche:
  Foundationalism with infinite regresses of probabilistic support. 3899-3917

Regular Articles

• 
  Leonardo Bich, Sara Green:
  Is defining life pointless? Operational definitions at the frontiers of biology. 3919-3946
• 
  Michele Palmira:
  Towards a pluralist theory of singular thought. 3947-3974
• 
  Mark Balaguer:
  Why the debate about composition is factually empty (or why there's no fact of the matter whether anything exists). 3975-4008
• 
  Shannon Spaulding:
  Do you see what I see? How social differences influence mindreading. 4009-4030
• 
  Kit Fine:
  Ignorance of ignorance. 4031-4045
• 
  Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia:
  Rigidity, instability and dimensionality. 4047-4062
• 
  Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann:
  The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy. 4063-4079
• 
  Rina Tzinman:
  Is Romeo dead? On the persistence of organisms. 4081-4105
• 
  Einar Duenger Bohn:
  Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism. 4107-4124
• 
  Roberto Fumagalli:
  Who is afraid of scientific imperialism? 4125-4146
• 
  Michael Hannon:
  Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy. 4147-4168
• 
  Paul R. Smart:
  Mandevillian intelligence. 4169-4200

Volume 195, Number 10, October 2018

Special Issue on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI-5)

• 
  Wiebe van der Hoek, Wesley H. Holliday, Wen-Fang Wang:
  Logic, rationality and interaction (LORI-5): introduction to the special issue. 4201-4204
• 
  Haim Gaifman, Yang Liu:
  A simpler and more realistic subjective decision theory. 4205-4241
• 
  Konstantinos Georgatos:
  Geodesic merging. 4243-4264
• 
  Sujata Ghosh, Rineke Verbrugge:
  Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models. 4265-4307
• 
  Peter Hawke, Shane Steinert-Threlkeld:
  Informational dynamics of epistemic possibility modals. 4309-4342
• 
  Dominik Klein, Olivier Roy, Norbert Gratzl:
  Knowledge, belief, normality, and introspection. 4343-4372
• 
  Alexander W. Kocurek:
  On the expressive power of first-order modal logic with two-dimensional operators. 4373-4417
• 
  Yanjing Wang:
  A logic of goal-directed knowing how. 4419-4439
• 
  Wen-Fang Wang:
  Three-valued semantic pluralism: a defense of a three-valued solution to the sorites paradox. 4441-4476

Regular articles

• 
  Jennifer Jhun, Patricia Palacios, James Owen Weatherall:
  Market crashes as critical phenomena? Explanation, idealization, and universality in econophysics. 4477-4505
• 
  Javier González de Prado Salas:
  Whose purposes? Biological teleology and intentionality. 4507-4524
• 
  David Yates:
  Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers. 4525-4550
• 
  Brent J. C. Madison:
  On justifications and excuses. 4551-4562
• 
  Jason D. Runyan:
  Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences. 4563-4580
• 
  Thomas Ågotnes, Hans van Ditmarsch, Yanjing Wang:
  True lies. 4581-4615
• 
  Andrei A. Buckareff:
  I'm just sitting around doing nothing: on exercising intentional agency in omitting to act. 4617-4635
• 
  Anthony F. Peressini:
  There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience. 4637-4666

Volume 195, Number 11, November 2018

Special Issue on Cartesian Epistemology

• 
  Jean-Baptiste Rauzy, Stefano Cossara, Xiaoxing Zhang:
  Cartesian epistemology: an introduction. 4667-4669
• 
  Richard Fumerton:
  Cartesian epistemology and infallible justification. 4671-4681
• 
  Stephen Hetherington:
  The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism. 4683-4702
• 
  Jean-Baptiste Guillon:
  The Evil Demon argument as based on closure plus meta-coherence. 4703-4731
• 
  Duncan Pritchard:
  Contextualism and radical scepticism. 4733-4750
• 
  David Rabouin:
  Logic of imagination. Echoes of Cartesian epistemology in contemporary philosophy of mathematics and beyond. 4751-4783
• 
  Pierre Saint-Germier:
  Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology. 4785-4816

Regular Articles

• 
  Matteo Colombo:
  Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debate. 4817-4838
• 
  Elay Shech:
  Idealizations, essential self-adjointness, and minimal model explanation in the Aharonov-Bohm effect. 4839-4863
• 
  Raamy Majeed:
  Why the Canberra plan won't help you do serious metaphysics. 4865-4882
• 
  Sherrilyn Roush:
  The epistemic superiority of experiment to simulation. 4883-4906
• 
  Thomas Pölzler:
  Can the empirical sciences contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate? 4907-4930
• 
  Marco Hausmann:
  The consequence argument ungrounded. 4931-4950
• 
  Roger Clarke:
  Assertion, belief, and context. 4951-4977
• 
  Colin McLear:
  Motion and the affection argument. 4979-4995
• 
  Hashem Morvarid:
  Finean essence, local necessity, and pure logical properties. 4997-5005
• 
  Jesse M. Butler:
  An entirely non-self-referential Yabloesque paradox. 5007-5019
• 
  Eileen S. Nutting:
  Ontological realism and sentential form. 5021-5036
• 
  Alasdair Richmond:
  Time travel, hyperspace and Cheshire Cats. 5037-5058
• 
  William D'Alessandro:
  Arithmetic, set theory, reduction and explanation. 5059-5089
• 
  Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker:
  Non-concrete parts of material objects. 5091-5111
• 
  Vincenzo Politi:
  Erratum to: Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences. 5113

Volume 195, Number 12, December 2018

Special Issue on Neuroscience and Its Philosophy

• 
  Adrian Downey:
  Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism). 5115-5139
• 
  Holger Lyre:
  Structures, dynamics and mechanisms in neuroscience: an integrative account. 5141-5158
• 
  Tuomas K. Pernu:
  Mental causation via neuroprosthetics? A critical analysis. 5159-5174
• 
  Julia Haas:
  An empirical solution to the puzzle of weakness of will. 5175-5195
• 
  Nora Heinzelmann:
  Deontology defended. 5197-5216
• 
  Joseph Gottlieb:
  Consciousness and the limits of memory. 5217-5243
• 
  Abel Wajnerman Paz:
  An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition. 5245-5269
• 
  John Bickle, Aaron Kostko:
  Connection experiments in neurobiology. 5271-5295
• 
  Stephen Gadsby, Daniel Williams:
  Action, affordances, and anorexia: body representation and basic cognition. 5297-5317
• 
  Lotem Elber-Dorozko:
  Manipulation is key: on why non-mechanistic explanations in the cognitive sciences also describe relations of manipulation and control. 5319-5337
• 
  Cameron Buckner:
  Empiricism without magic: transformational abstraction in deep convolutional neural networks. 5339-5372
• 
  Philipp Haueis:
  Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function. 5373-5402
• 
  Alex Morgan:
  Mindless accuracy: on the ubiquity of content in nature. 5403-5429
• 
  Koray Karaca:
  Lessons from the Large Hadron Collider for model-based experimentation: the concept of a model of data acquisition and the scope of the hierarchy of models. 5431-5452
• 
  Alexandra Plakias:
  The response model of moral disgust. 5453-5472
• 
  John Dougherty:
  What inductive explanations could not be. 5473-5483
• 
  Gabriele Pulcini, Achille C. Varzi:
  Paraconsistency in classical logic. 5485-5496
• 
  Jonah Goldwater:
  Physicalism and the sortalist conception of objects. 5497-5519
• 
  Nicholas Griffin:
  Brandom and the brutes. 5521-5547
• 
  Aidan Gray:
  Lexical-rule predicativism about names. 5549-5569
• 
  Michael Thicke:
  Market epistemology. 5571-5594