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Synthese, Volume 180
Volume 180, Number 1, May 2011
- Roman Frigg, Stephan Hartmann, Cyrille Imbert:
Preface. 1-2 - Stathis Psillos:
Living with the abstract: realism and models. 3-17 - Christopher Pincock:
Modeling reality. 19-32 - Alisa Bokulich:
How scientific models can explain. 33-45 - Uskali Mäki:
Models and the locus of their truth. 47-63 - Jan Sprenger:
Science without (parametric) models: the case of bootstrap resampling. 65-76 - Roman Frigg, Julian Reiss:
The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same old stew? 77
Volume 180, Number 2, May 2011
- Gerhard Schurz, Ioannis Votsis:
Editorial introduction to scientific realism quo vadis? Theories, structures, underdetermination and reference. 79-85 - James Ladyman:
Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air. 87-101 - Gerhard Schurz:
Structural correspondence, indirect reference, and partial truth: phlogiston theory and Newtonian mechanics. 103-120 - Ioannis Votsis:
Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference. 121-137 - Ludwig Fahrbach:
How the growth of science ends theory change. 139-155 - John Worrall:
Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence. 157-172 - Paul Hoyningen-Huene:
Reconsidering the miracle argument on the supposition of transient underdetermination. 173-187 - Martin Carrier:
Underdetermination as an epistemological test tube: expounding hidden values of the scientific community. 189-204 - Steven French:
Metaphysical underdetermination: why worry? 205-221 - F. A. Muller:
Withering away, weakly. 223-233 - Holger Lyre:
Is structural underdetermination possible? 235-247 - Michael Friedman:
Carnap on theoretical terms: structuralism without metaphysics. 249-263 - Hannes Leitgeb:
New life for Carnap's Aufbau? 265-299 - Stathis Psillos:
Choosing the realist framework. 301-316
Volume 180, Number 3, June 2011
- Susanne Bobzien:
In defense of true higher-order vagueness. 317-335 - Bryan W. Roberts:
How Galileo dropped the ball and Fermat picked it up. 337-356 - Benjamin Bayer:
A role for abstractionism in a direct realist foundationalism. 357-389 - Maria van der Schaar:
The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory. 391-417 - Daniel G. Campos:
On the distinction between Peirce's abduction and Lipton's Inference to the best explanation. 419-442 - Pete Mandik:
Supervenience and neuroscience. 443-463
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